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In the debate over the introduction of open-ended fair use
provisions in the copyright legislation of civil law countries, it is
often argued that judges with a civil law background do not have the
experience necessary to apply open-ended norms in an appropriate
way.1 The argument poses an obstacle to a meaningful debate about
fair use because of its destabilizing effect. Policy makers are
concerned that the adoption of fair use provisions could cause legal
uncertainty and erode traditional civil law culture in the field of
* Ph.D.; Professor of Intellectual Property, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Of
Counsel, Bird & Bird, The Hague. A draft of this article was presented at the 2017
Symposium “Globalizing Fair Use: Exploring the Diffusion of General, Open and
Flexible Exceptions in Copyright Law”, organized by American University
Washington College of Law’s Program on Information Justice and Intellectual
Property (PIJIP). The author wishes to thank participants for their helpful
comments, especially Professors Irene Calboli, Michael Caroll, Niva Elkin-Koren,
Orit Fischman Afori, Sean Flynn, Henning Große Ruse-Khan, Peter Jaszi, and
Matthew Sag.
1. Martin Senftleben, Comparative Approaches to Fair Use: An Important
Impulse for Reforms in EU Copyright Law, in METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 30, 44-46 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 2013) [hereinafter
Comparative Approaches to Fair Use] (arguing that the various criticisms lodged
against civil law judges are not valid arguments against open-ended fair use
provisions in copyright law).
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copyright. The situation in the European Union (“EU”) can serve as
an example.2 Despite strong pleas for the introduction of an opening
clause3 and the emergence of more fair use legislation in other
regions,4 the current reform proposals of the European Commission
do not include adopting an open-ended fair use norm.5 While the
2013/2014 Public Consultation on the Review of EU Copyright
Rules explicitly addressed the need for more flexibility,6 the
2. See Report on the Responses to the Public Consultation on the Review of
the EU Copyright Rules, at 34, COM (July 2014) (“These stakeholders are
particularly against the introduction of an open norm that is similar to the ‘fair use’
principle in the US. They argue that this would not be in line with European legal
traditions and that replacing statutory law by judge-made law would inevitably
result in less legal certainty. They point out that in the US, nearly two hundred
years of case-law supports the application of this principle. This would not be the
case in Europe, if such a principle was introduced”).
3. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Flexible Copyright: Can EU Author’s Right
Accommodate Fair Use?, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND
EXCEPTIONS 242, 242-243 (Cambridge University Press 2016) [hereinafter
Flexible Copyright]; P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Martin R.F. Senftleben, Fair Use in
Europe. In Search of Flexibilities 8-9 (Amsterdam L. Sch., Res. Paper No. 2012-
39, 2011); P. B. HUGENHOLTZ, AUTEURSRECHT OP INFORMATIE 170-171
(Deventer: Kluwer 1989); Jonathan Griffiths, The “Three-Step Test” in European
Copyright Law – Problems and Solutions, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 428, 444-45 (2009);
Senftleben, Comparative Approaches to Fair Use, supra note 1, at 35; Martin
Senftleben, Bridging the Differences Between Copyright’s Legal Traditions – The
Emerging EC Fair Use Doctrine, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 521, 540 (2010)
[hereinafter Bridging the Differences Between Copyright’s Legal Traditions];
Martin Senftleben, The International Three-Step Test: A Model Provision for EC
Fair Use Legislation, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & E-COM. L. 67, 69 (2010)
[hereinafter The International Three-Step Test]; Christiaan Alberdingk Thijm, Fair
use: het auteursrechtelijk evenwicht hersteld, 9 AMI 145 (1998); European
Copyright Code Proposal, THEWITTEMGROUP 123, 126 (2010).
4. See Orit F. Afori, An Open Standard “Fair Use” Doctrine: A Welcome
Israeli Initiative, 30 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 85, 85 (2008); Guy Pessach, The
New Israeli Copyright Act – Case-Study in Reverse Comparative Law, 41 INT’L
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 187, 189-193 (2010).
5. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, at 3, COM (2016) 593 final
(Sept. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Proposal for a Directive] (proposing greater
transparency and balanced contractual relationships between creators and rights
holders).
6. See Public Consultation on the Review of the EU Copyright Rules, at 18,
33-36 COM (Mar. 3, 2014) (showing that end users/consumers and institutional
users of protected material were in favor of the adoption of an opening clause,
whereas authors/performers, publishers/producers/broadcasters and collective
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proposed new copyright legislation is silent on the issue. 7
Against this background, the following analysis seeks to dispel
unfounded concerns about overstrained judges. The analysis seeks to
pave the way for new fair use legislation in the EU by showing civil
law judges are capable of applying open-ended fair use norms
adequately and consistently. To lay groundwork for this analysis,
Section 1 will outline the legislative traditions underlying copyright
limitations in civil law countries (the majority of EU member states)
and common law countries (such as the U.S.) before emphasizing in
Section 2 the need for the introduction of open-ended fair use
legislation in civil law systems, in particular in EU copyright law. On
this basis, Section 3 discusses strategies for translating lessons to be
learned from the U.S. fair use approach into the EU system. Section
4 then demonstrates that the introduction of a flexible copyright
limitation is unlikely to fail because of an inability or reluctance of
civil law judges to apply open-ended norms. It provides an analysis
of the existing open-ended defense of “due cause” in EU trademark
law to show that the opposite is true. This paper ends, through
Sections 5 and 6, by pointing out that a flexible copyright limitation
in civil law jurisdictions need not be a verbatim copy of the U.S. fair
use doctrine. It seems preferable to apply traditional limitation
prototypes by analogy in situations that require new use privileges.
To establish a system that allows this analogous application,
however, the role of the three-step test in EU copyright law would
have to be recalibrated.
I. COPYRIGHT’S LEGAL TRADITIONS
International law making and harmonization activities have led to
a remarkable approximation of Anglo-American copyright and
continental European droit d’auteur.8 To this day, however, the
approaches to copyright limitations differ significantly. Whereas
continental European countries provide for a closed catalogue of
carefully defined exceptions, the Anglo-American copyright tradition
management organizations were against the adoption of a fair use element).
7. Proposal for a Directive, supra note 5, at 2.
8. See Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 3, at 8-9 (advocating for the
implementation of fair use practices).
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allows for an open-ended fair use system that leaves the task of
identifying individual cases of exempted unauthorized use to the
courts.9
Reflecting the continental European approach, Article 5 of the
Information Society Directive (ISD) sets forth various types of
specific copyright exceptions.10 Besides the mandatory exemption of
temporary acts of reproduction to be implemented by all member
states, Article 5 contains optional exceptions that relate to private
copying; use of copyrighted material by libraries, museums, and
archives; ephemeral recordings; reproductions of broadcasts made by
hospitals and prisons; illustrations for teaching or scientific research;
use for the benefit of people with disabilities; press privileges; use
for the purpose of quotations, caricature, parody, and pastiche; use
for the purposes of public security and for the proper performance or
reporting of administrative, parliamentary, or judicial proceedings;
use of political speeches and public lectures; use during religious or
official celebrations; use of architectural works located permanently
in public places; incidental inclusions of a work in other material;
use for the purpose of advertising the public exhibition or sale of
artistic works; use in connection with the demonstration or repair of
equipment; use for the reconstruction of buildings; and additional
cases of use having minor importance.11 The EU legislator added
specific exceptions concerning the digitization of orphan works in
the Orphan Works Directive.12 In the current debate on the reform of
9. The International Three-Step Test, supra note 3, at 68.
10. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related
Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16-17 [hereinafter
Directive 2001/29/EC].
11. Id.
12. See Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 25 October 2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, 2012 O.J. (L
299) 5, 9-10; MIRJAM ELFERINK & ALLARD RINGNALDA, DIGITALE ONTSLUITING
VAN HISTORISCHE ARCHIEVEN EN VERWEESDE WERKEN (2009); A.C. Beunen & L.
Guibault, Brussels Memorandum of Understanding inzake digitalisering en online
beschikbaarstelling van out-of-commerce boeken en tijdschriften, 6 AMI 221
(2011); Stef van Gompel, Unlocking the Potential of Pre-Existing Content: How to
Address the Issue of Orphan Works in Europe?, 38 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 669, 679-80 (2007) [hereinafter Unlocking the Potential of Pre-
Existing Content]; David B. Sherman, Cost and Resource Allocation Under the
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EU copyright law, the European Commission tabled proposals that
would lead to the introduction of a specific text-and-data mining
exception in favor of research institutions13 and specific exceptions
for the cross-border exchange of special format copies for persons
who are blind or print disabled in line with the Marrakesh Treaty.14
A prominent example of the Anglo-American approach to
copyright limitations is the fair use doctrine in the U.S.15 Section 107
of the U.S. Copyright Act permits the unauthorized use of
copyrighted material for purposes “such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research.”16 To guide the
decision on individual forms of use, four factors are set forth in the
provision which shall be taken into account among other
Orphan Works Act of 2006: Would the Act Reduce Transaction Costs, Allocate
Orphan Works Efficiently, and Serve the Goals of Copyright Law?, 12 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 10, 13 (2007).
13. See Proposal for a Directive, supra note 5, at 6; Marco Caspers & Lucie
Guibault, Baseline Report of Policies and Barriers of TDM in Europe,
FUTURETDM 2, 9-10, 12 (2016), http://project.futuretdm.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/FutureTDM_D3.3-Baseline-Report-of-Policies-and-
Barriers-of-TDM-in-Europe.pdf (discussing an overview of legal aspects of text-
and-data mining in the EU).
14. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Cross-Border Exchange between the Union and Third Countries of
Accessible Format Copies of Certain Works and Other Subject-Matter Protected
by Copyright and Related Rights for the Benefit of Persons who are Blind, Visually
Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, at 2, COM (2016) 595 final (Sept. 14,
2016); see LAURENCE R. HELFER ET AL., THEWORLD BLIND UNION GUIDE TO THE
MARRAKESH TREATY 1, 8, 10 (2017); Judith Sullivan, Study on Copyright
Limitations and Exceptions for the Visually Impaired, WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION [WIPO], at 16 WIPO Doc. SCCR/15/7 (Feb. 20, 2007),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_15/sccr_15_7.pdf; Paul
Harpur & Nicolas Suzor, Copyright Protections and Disability Rights: Turning the
Page to a New International Paradigm, 36 U. N.S.W. L.J. 745, 746-47 (2013);
Marketa Trimble, The Marrakesh Puzzle, 45 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 768, 770 (2017); Jonathan Band & Peter Jaszi, Model Statute for
Implementation of the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works
for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled,
INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Sept. 26, 2013), http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/09/MODEL-STATUTE-FOR-MARRAKESH-IMPLEMENTATION.pdf.
15. United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
16. Leon E. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright: The “Exclusive
Rights” Tensions in the New Copyright Act, 24 BULL., COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.
215, 231 (1977) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107).
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considerations that may be relevant in a given case:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.17
On the basis of this legislative framework and established case
law, U.S. courts conduct a case-by-case analysis to determine
whether the court can exempt a given use from the control of the
copyright holder.18
The remarkable difference in the regulation of copyright
limitations becomes understandable in the light of the theoretical
groundwork underlying common law and civil law copyright
systems.19 The fair use approach can be traced back to the utilitarian
foundation of the Anglo-American copyright tradition that perceives
copyright as a privilege granted to enhance the overall welfare of
society by ensuring a sufficient supply of knowledge and
information.20 Therefore, the exclusive rights of authors deserve
individual positive legal enactment.21 The forms of use that need not
be reserved for the right owner to provide the necessary incentive
17. U.S. Copyright Act § 107.
18. Cf. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 416, 447-48, 452-
56 (1984) (using the equitable rule of reason to judge infringement claims).
19. Seltzer, supra note 16, at 260.
20. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 559
(1985) (referring to copyright as an “engine of free expression”).
21. Cf. Alain Strowel, Droit d’auteur and Copyright: Between History and
Nature, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW 235, 241-249
(Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994) (establishing copyright as a positive
legal enactment and droit d’auteur as a natural right); Steve P. Calandrillo, An
Economic Analysis of Property Rights in Information: Justifications and Problems
of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate Information, and the Alternative of a
Government-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
301, 310 (1998) (finding property rights to be legislated rights not natural rights).
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remain free.22 Otherwise, the legislator would award rights that are
unnecessary to achieve the goals of the system. In sum, exclusive
rights are thus delineated precisely, while their limitation can be
regulated flexibly in open-ended provisions, such as fair use.23
Oversimplifying the theoretical model underlying common law
copyright, one might say that freedom of use is the rule; rights are
the exception.
The opposite constellation – rights the rule, freedom the exception
– follows from the natural law underpinning of continental European
droit d’auteur.24 In the natural law theory, the author occupies center
stage.25 A literary or artistic work is perceived as a materialization of
the author’s personality.26 Accordingly, it is assumed that a bond
unites the author with the object of her creation.27 Moreover, the
author acquires a property right in her work by virtue of the mere act
of creation.28 This has the corollary that nothing is left to the law
apart from formally recognizing what is already inherent in the very
nature of things.29 The author-centrism of the civil law system calls
on the legislator to safeguard broad rights, giving authors the
opportunity to profit from the use of their self-expression and to bar
factors that might stymie their exploitation.30 In consequence, civil
law copyright systems recognize flexible, broad exclusive rights.31 In
contrast, civil law courts define rights narrowly and often
22. Calandrillo, supra note 21, at 310.
23. See Paul E. Geller, Must Copyright Be For Ever Caught Between
Marketplace and Authorship Norms?, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON
COPYRIGHT LAW 159, 170 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994); Strowel,
supra note 21, at 250-251.
24. Bernard Edelman, The Law’s Eye: Nature and Copyright, in OF AUTHORS
AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW 79, 82-87 (Brad Sherman & Alain
Strowel eds., 1994).
25. Id. at 82-87; Geller, supra note 23, at 169-70; Strowel, supra note 21, at
236-37.
26. Edelman, supra note 24, at 82-87.
27. Cf. HENRI DESBOIS, LE DROIT D’AUTEUR EN FRANCE 236-37 (Paris:Dalloz
1978); EUGEN ULMER, URHEBER- UND VERLAGSRECT 110-11 (Springer-Verlag, 3d
ed., 1980).
28. DESBOIS, supra note 27, at 236-37; ULMER, supra note 27, at 110-11.
29. DESBOIS, supra note 27, at 538; ULMER, supra note 27, at 105-06.
30. DESBOIS, supra note 27, at 538; ULMER, supra note 27, at 105-06.
31. DESBOIS, supra note 27, at 538; ULMER, supra note 27, at 105-06.
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restrictively.32
Both approaches to copyright limitations have specific merits.
Precisely defined exceptions in continental European countries may
offer a high degree of legal certainty.33 With a closed catalogue of
permissible exceptions and a detailed description of their scope, it
becomes foreseeable for users and investors which forms of use fall
under the control of the copyright holder and can serve as a basis for
the exploitation of copyrighted material, and which acts of
unauthorized use remain outside this controlled area and can be
carried out without infringing copyright.34
The central advantage of the Anglo-American fair use approach is
flexibility.35 Within a flexible fair use framework, the courts can
broaden and restrict the scope of copyright limitations to safeguard
copyright’s delicate balance between exclusive rights and competing
social, cultural, and economic needs. This renders judges capable of
adapting the copyright limitation infrastructure to new circumstances
and challenges, such as the digital environment.36 Leaving this
discretion to the courts reduces the need for constant amendments to
legislation that may have difficulty in keeping pace with the speed of
32. See Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forenig, 2009
E.C.R. 1, ¶ 76, http://curia.europa.edu (insisting on the need to interpret copyright
exceptions strictly); ACHIM FORSTER, FAIR USE: EIN SYSTEMVERGLEICH DER
SCHRANKENGENERALKLAUSEL DES US-AMERIKANISCHEN COPYRIGHT ACT MIT
DEM SCHRANKENKATALOG DES DEUTSCHEN URHEBERRECHTSGESETZES 182-84
(2008); cf. Geller, supra note 23, at 170; Strowel, supra note 21, at 236-37
(explaining the traditional, narrow interpretation of copyright exceptions in civil
law jurisdictions).
33. Cf. H. Cohen Jehoram, Wie is bang voor de driestappentoets in de
Auteursrechtrichtlijn?, in N.A.N.M 57 (van Eijk & P.B. Hugenholtz, eds., 2006);
H. Cohen Jehoram, Nu de gevolgen van trouw en ontrouw aan de
Auteursrechtrichtlijn voor fair use, tijdelijke reproductive en driestappentoets, 29
AMI 153 (2005); H. Cohen Jehoram, Fair Use – die ferne Geliebte, 22 AMI 174
(1998); Andre Lucas, For a Reasonable Interpretation of the Three-Step Test, 32
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 277, 282 (2010) (suggesting fair use does not lead to the
desired legal certainty); H. Cohen Jehoram, Implementatie van de
Auteursrechtrichtlijn – De stille strijd tegen een spookrijder, NEDERLANDS
JURISTENBLAD 1690 (2002).
34. Lucas, supra note 33, at 282.
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technological development.37
There are benefits that accrue from flexible copyright limitations
in the ongoing process of adapting copyright law to the rapid
development of the Internet. Broad copyright protection, which the
U.S. and EU both grant, is likely to absorb and restrict new
possibilities of use even though this may be undesirable from the
perspective of social, cultural, or economic needs.38 User-generated
content, advanced search engine services, and the digitization of
cultural material can serve as examples of current phenomena
requiring the reconsideration of the scope of copyright limitations.39
Without sufficient breathing space, important social, cultural, and
economic benefits that could be derived from timely adaptations of
the legal framework are likely to be lost.40 By contrast, on the basis
37. See Martin Senftleben, Beperkingen à la carte: Waarom de
Auteursrechtrichtlijn ruimte laat voor fair use, 1 AMI 10 (2003); Thijm, Fair use:
het auteursrechtelijk evenwicht hersteld, supra note 3, at 145; Christiaan
Alberdingk Thijm, Fair Use – In weiter Ferne, so nah, 10 AMI 176 (1998).
38. See OTTO DEPENHEUER & KLAUS-NIKOLAUS PEIFER, GEISTIGES
EIGENTUM: SCHUTZRECHT ODER AUSBEUTUNGSTITEL? (2008); CHRISTOPHE
GEIGER, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET DROIT DU PUBLIC À L’INFORMATION, APPROCHE DE
DROIT COMPARE (2004); Reto M. Hilty, Sündenbock Urheberrecht, in GEISTIGES
EIGENTUM UND GEMEINFREIHEIT 107, 111 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007); RETO
M. HILTY & ALEXANDER PEUKERT, INTERESSENAUSGLEICH IM URHEBERRECHT
(2004); Thomas Hoeren, Urheberrecht in der Informationsgesellschaft, in
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT 866 (1997); MAZZIOTTI,
supra note 35, at 33-55.
39. Cf. ELFERINK & RINGNALDA, supra note 12; NATALI HELBERGER ET AL.,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF USER CREATED CONTENT, 3, 14 (2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499333; Michael Knopp, Fanfiction – nutzergenerierte
Inhalte und das Urheberrecht, in GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND
URHEBERRECHT 28 (2010); Beunen & Guibault, supra note 12, at 221-226; Stef
van Gompel, Het richtlijnvoorstel verweesde werken, 6 AMI 205 (2011); Gompel,
Unlocking the Potential of Pre-Existing Content, supra note 12, at 700-01; Martin
Senftleben, Internet Search Results – A Permissible Quotation?, 235 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 1, 10, 13, 15, 18 (2013) [hereinafter
Internet Search Results]; Martin Senftleben, Pacman Forever – Preserving van
computergames, 6 AMI 221 (2009); Sherman, supra note 12, at 13-14, 17J; V.J.
van Hoboken, De aansprakelijkheid van zoekmachines. Uitzondering zonder regels
of regels zonder uitzondering?, COMPUTERRECHT, 2008-1, at 15-22 (2008) (all
pointing out that these new phenomena pose difficult questions that cannot be
solved satisfactorily on the basis of existing, narrowly-defined copyright
exceptions).
40. Internet Search Results, supra note 39, at 10, 13, 15, 18.
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of an elastic fair use test, the courts can keep the broad grant of
protection within reasonable limits and inhibit exclusive rights from
unduly curtailing competing freedoms - in particular freedom of
expression and freedom of competition.41
II. NEED FOR REFORMS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Considering these options, law makers may realize at least one of
the outlined potential advantages – enhanced legal certainty on the
basis of precisely-defined exceptions, or sufficient flexibility
resulting from open-ended fair use legislation.42 In the light of
important opportunities for economic, social, and cultural
development offered by the rapid development of the Internet, the
advantage of flexibility may even be deemed more important than
the benefits of enhanced legal certainty.43 However, instead of
following these guidelines, the drafters of EU copyright law
developed a system that frustrates both objectives. The present
regulation of copyright limitations in the EU offers neither legal
certainty, nor sufficient flexibility.44
To establish this inconsistent system, the EU legislator combined
elements of both traditions of copyright law in the most unfortunate
41. See Egbert Dommering, DE ACHTERVOLGING VAN PROMETHEUS – OVER
VRIJHEID EN BEZIT VAN INFORMATIE (2008); Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and
Freedom of Expression in Europe, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION,
240 (N. Elkin-Koren, ed., 2002) [hereinafter Copyright and Freedom of
Expression]; Sandro Macciacchini, URHEBERRECHT UND MEINUNGSFREIHEIT
(2000); Alain Strowel et al., DROIT D’AUTEUR ET LIBERTÉ D’EXPRESSION (2006);
Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 378-80 (1999);
Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The
Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union,
37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 371, 402-03 (2006) [hereinafter
“Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law?]; Neil W. Netanel, Copyright
and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L. REV. 283, 289 (1996).
42. Bridging the Differences Between Copyright’s Legal Traditions, supra note
3, at 540.
43. See Afori, supra note 4, at 85; Pessach, supra note 4, at 189-93.
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way.45 In the ISD, Article 5(1) to (4) sets forth the closed catalogue
of exceptions described above.46 This enumeration of exceptions is in
line with the continental European copyright tradition.47 Yet the
listed exceptions are subject to the EU three-step test laid down in
Article 5(5) of the ISD.48 As the test consists of several open-ended
criteria, it recalls the Anglo-American copyright tradition.49
However, the interplay between the two elements – the closed
catalogue and the open three-step test – is regulated as follows: “The
exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4
shall only be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
rightholder.”50
This approach, inevitably, leads to a dilemma. As discussed, a
closed list of precisely defined exceptions may have the advantage of
enhanced legal certainty.51 But this potential advantage is beyond
reach under the current EU system.52 If national legislation adopts
and further specifies exceptions listed in the EU catalogue, copyright
holders may still challenge these specific national exceptions on the
45. See Frank Bayreuther, Beschränkungen des Urheberrechts nach der neuen
EU-Urheberrechtsrichtlinie, 45 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT
828 (2011); Michael Hart, The Proposed Directive for Copyright in the
Information Society: Nice Rights, Shame About the Exceptions, 20 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 169, 169-71 (1998); Bernt Hugenholtz, Why the Copyright Directive is
Unimportant, and Possibly Invalid, 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 501, 501-02
(2000); Jorge Reinbothe, Die EG-Richtlinie zum Urheberrecht in der
Informationsgesellschaft, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT
INTERNATIONAL 733 (2001); Dirk Visser, De beperkingen in de
Auteursrechtrichtilijn, 1 AMI 9 (2001).
46. Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, art. 5(1)-(4).
47. Id.
48. Id., art. 5(5) (detailing the various limitations of the article).
49. See World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO], Records of the Intellectual Property
Conference of Stockholm June 11 to July 14, 1967, at 629-31(1971) [hereinafter
WIPO] (noting that the criterion of “no conflict with a normal exploitation,”
resembles the fourth factor of the U.S. fair use doctrine “effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”).
50. Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, art. 5(5).
51. Griffiths, supra note 3, at 429-30.
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grounds that they are incompatible with the EU three-step test.53 As a
result, a judge hearing a copyright case may invoke the EU three-step
test to further restrict national exceptions that are embedded in a
national framework of precisely defined use privileges.54 National
copyright exceptions are thus straitjacketed; their validity is hanging
by the thread of compliance with the abstract criteria of the EU three-
step test.55 The test itself only serves as a vehicle to place additional
constraints on national exceptions that are defined narrowly
anyway.56 Unlike fair use provisions with comparable abstract
criteria, courts cannot employ the EU three-step test to create new,
additional forms of permitted unauthorized use.57 Hence, it is
impossible to realize the central advantage of flexibility that is
inherent in the test’s open-ended wording.58
In consequence, the current EU system fails to realize any
advantage that may follow from the outlined Anglo-American or
continental-European approach to copyright limitations. Legal
certainty is minimized under the current legal regime because the
application of the open-ended three-step test imposes further
constraints on exceptions that are defined precisely in the national
laws of EU member states.59 With its abstract criteria, the three-step
test erodes the legal certainty that could result from a precise
definition of use privileges.60
As law-making in the EU is slower than in individual countries,
the current regulation of limitations in the EU is particularly
53. Id. at 433-34.
54. Id. at 441, 445-47.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Griffiths, supra note 3, at 456-57.
58. Cf. Christophe Geiger, The Three-Step Test, a Threat to a Balanced
Copyright Law?, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 683, 694-96 (2006);
Griffiths, supra note 3, at 429, 436-38; K.J. Koelman, De nationale
driestappentoets, 27 AMI 6 (2003); Martin Senftleben, Fair Use in the
Netherlands – a Renaissance?, 1 AMI 1, 1 (2009) [hereinafter Fair Use in the
Netherlands] (pointing out that the three-step test as such is a provision with a
flexible, open wording that could be used to enhance the flexibility of national
copyright systems).
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problematic.61 The process of updating EU copyright legislation
requires not only lengthy negotiations at union level, but also
national implementation acts in all member states.62 Therefore,
reactions to unforeseen technological developments and new social,
cultural, or economic needs will be as slow as in traditional
continental European systems with precisely-defined exceptions. In
the EU, these reactions will be far too slow to keep pace with the
rapid development of the Internet. The total legislative response to a
new technological development may need more than ten years.63
Against this background, the time is ripe to reconsider the
regulation of copyright limitations in the EU. Reforms should
primarily seek to enhance flexibility rendering the EU copyright
system capable of coping with the rapid development of the Internet
and the ongoing evolution of socially valuable Internet services.64
The introduction of a fair use element seems indispensable to achieve
this goal. Regulations also require more flexibility because the
process of EU policy making in the field of copyright limitations is
far too slow to maintain a closed system of precisely-defined
exceptions that necessitates repeated legislative intervention.65 Given
the social, cultural, and economic concerns at stake, it would be
irresponsible not to switch to a more sustainable law making system
that includes flexible elements.66 It is highly problematic that current
reform proposals in the EU, as already pointed out, do not seize the
opportunity of introducing an opening clause in the existing system
61. See Christophe Geiger et al., Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of
the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 39 INT’L INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION
L. 707, 709 (2008) [hereinafter Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation] (arguing
that in order to reduce the harm flowing from the Copyright Directive, the EU
three-step test should at least be construed flexibly); Senftleben, Fair Use in the
Netherlands, supra note 58, at 2-4.
62. Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, art. 13.
63. See MIREILLE VAN EECHOUD ET AL., HARMONIZING EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT
LAW: THE CHALLENGES OF BETTER LAWMAKING 298 (2009) (describing the time it
takes to pass even basic EU legislation).
64. Id. at 106.
65. Id. at 173.
66. See Proposal for a Directive, supra note 5, at 2 (stating new types of uses
have recently emerged so it remains uncertain whether the exceptions are still able
to achieve a fair balance).
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of precisely-defined copyright limitations.67
III. LESSONS TO LEARN FROM THE
U.S. FAIR USE DOCTRINE
The U.S. fair use doctrine68 could serve as a model in this regard.
As the above-cited reference to purposes “such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research”
indicates, the list of privileged purposes underlying the fair use
doctrine is an open, non-exclusive enumeration.69 The U.S. Senate
and House Committee Reports that accompanied the codification of
the fair use doctrine, moreover, leave no doubt about the intention to
preserve the flexibility of the doctrine following from its evolution in
case law:
[S]ince the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable
definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided
on its own facts . . . The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of
the judicial doctrine of fair use . . . but there is no disposition to freeze
the doctrine in the statute . . . Beyond a very broad statutory explanation
of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must
be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case
basis.70
The required case-by-case analysis can be based on, but need not
be restricted to, the four factors relating to the purpose and character
of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and
substantiality of the taking, and the effect of the use upon the
exploitation of the copyrighted work.71 As a guiding principle, case
67. Id.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
69. Id.
70. LEON E. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIRUSE IN COPYRIGHT 19-20 (1978).
71. See ACHIM FÖRSTER, FAIR USE 197-201 (2008); Barton Beebe, An
Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 549, 580 (2008) (stating conscientious judges will dutifully consider each of
the four factors even when the outcome of the fair use test is obvious); Pierre N.
Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106-07 (1990)
(stating judges’ opinions reflect widely differing notions of the meaning of fair use
and decisions are not governed by consistent principles, but seem rather to result
from intuitive reactions to individual fact patterns); Jessica Litman, Reforming
Information Law in Copyright’s Image, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 587, 611 (1997)
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law evolves the notion of transformative use.72 Traditionally, this
overarching consideration constitutes an important factor capable of
tipping the scales to a finding of fair use.73 In the famous parody case
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose,74 for instance, the Supreme Court of the
United States confirmed that the question of whether the use was
transformative did hold significant weight. The case concerned a rap
version of Roy Orbison’s and William Dees’ song “Oh, Pretty
Woman,” which the rap group 2 Live Crew composed to satirize the
intact world built up in the original.75 Assessing the ironic nature of
the song, the Court explained with regard to the fair use analysis:
The central purpose of this investigation is to see . . . whether the new
work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation . . . or instead
adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering
(stating that we did not design our current copyright laws to govern new
technologies); see also David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy
Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 281 (2003) (commenting that
courts tend to make an initial judgment and then align the factors to fit the result
the best they can); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 54-57
(2012) (stating judges have increasingly relied on the four factors to frame their
analysis in fair use case and lawyers also craft their briefs and advice to clients
around the factors); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2537, 2565-73 (2009) (stating, as an example, courts should pay attention to
whether a ruling in a copyright owner’s favor will have a chilling effect on free
speech and free expression activities by other authors, speakers, and publishers);
cf. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 447-52 (“[17 U.S.C. § 107] identifies various factors
that enable a court to apply an ‘equitable rule of reason’ analysis to particular
claims of infringement”).
72. See Sag, supra note 71, at 55 (“The phrase ‘transformative use’ has loomed
large in fair use jurisprudence ever since the Supreme Court embraced
transformativeness as the heart of fair use in its 1994 Campbell decision. . . .
Transformativeness not only occupies the core of the fair use doctrine but also
reduces the importance of all other factors such that ‘the more transformative the
new work, the less will be the significance of other factors.’”).
73. Cf. Leval, supra note 71, at 1111 (stating the challenged use must be
transformative, the use must be productive, and the use must employ the quoted
matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original); Netanel,
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, supra note 41, at 381 (stating that,
depending on the quantitative and qualitative importance of the sampled material
for the original work, transformative uses should either qualify as a fair use, with
the burden on the plaintiff to show market substitution, or be subject to some form
of compulsory license).
74. 510 U.S. 569, 596 (1994).
75. Id. at 572.
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the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other
words, whether and to what extent the new work is “transformative.”76
In comments on the fair use doctrine, the notion of transformative
use is understood in the sense of productive use.77 The fair use must
aim to employ the copyrighted matter in a different manner or for a
purpose different from the original.78 Mere repackaging or
republication is insufficient.79 By contrast, a use adding value to the
original, transforming the original to new information, new
aesthetics, new insights, and new understandings, constitutes “the
very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for
the enrichment of society.”80 The aim of supporting freedom of
speech and cultural follow-on innovation, therefore, lies at the core
of the fair use doctrine.81
Given the flexibility following from the configuration of the U.S.
fair use doctrine, it is not surprising that U.S. courts managed to keep
pace with several new developments in the digital environment on
this basis.82 U.S. decisions on advanced search engine services can
serve as an example.83 Discussing Google’s image search service, the
76. Id. at 580.




81. See Samuelson, supra note 71, at 2568-69 (stating fair use promotes the
constitutional purposes of copyright by allowing authors to draw upon expression
from the original works in a way that advances the progress of science and useful
arts).
82. See Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 519-20,
541-2, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (recognizing the transformative purpose of the online
platform as a reference guide: “Because it serves these reference purposes, rather
than the entertainment or aesthetic purposes of the original works, the Lexicon’s
use is transformative and does not supplant the objects of the Harry Potter works;”
while also stating that the decision creates breathing space for user-generated
reference guides to commercial productions, such as the Harry Potter books); cf.
Andrew Jonas Sanders, J.K. Rowling and the Lexicon, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
45, 47 (2009) (recognizing that the District Court supported its decision on specific
examples where either the amount of copyrighted material taken was more than
reasonably necessary, or taken from companion books, or where there was a
blatant inconsistency of the entries in both the amount and lack of citation to the
original material used).
83. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc., 508 F. 3d 1146, 1163 (9th Cir. 2007)
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals qualified Google’s display of image
thumbnails as a fair use.84 The Court relied on the concept of
transformative use in this context.85 It emphasized significant
benefits for the public and noted that “a search engine may be more
transformative than a parody because a search engine provides an
entirely new use for the original work, while a parody typically has
the same entertainment purpose as the original work.”86 Finally, the
assessment led to the conclusion that “the significantly
transformative nature of Google’s search engine, particularly in light
of its public benefit, outweighs Google’s superseding and
commercial uses of the thumbnails in this case. In reaching this
conclusion, we note the importance of analyzing fair use flexibly in
light of new circumstances.”87
Continental-European case law on the same search engine service
is different because the analysis must focus on a specific copyright
exception in the absence of an open-ended fair use provision.88 A
specific exception that can play a role in this context is the right of
quotation laid down in Article 5(3)(d) ISD. The German Federal
Court of Justice, however, doubted that the image search could be
justified in the light of the right of quotation, as implemented at the
national level in § 51 of the German Copyright Act.89 In Germany,
the quotation right is traditionally confined to criticism or review.90
Transposing the ISD into national law, the German legislator
maintained this requirement of a specific context.91 The specific
(stating that the Court must be flexible in applying a fair use analysis because they
are not bright line rules nor are the factors able to be treated in isolation; all factors
are to be explored and the results weighed together).
84. Id. at 1176.
85. Id. at 1166.
86. Id. at 1165.
87. Id. at 1166. For a detailed discussion of this point, see Senftleben,
Comparative Approaches to Fair Use, supra note 1, at 44-46.
88. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH][Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 29, 2010, I ZR
69/08, http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Ge
richt=bgh&Art=en&az=I%20ZR%2069/08.
89. Id.; Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] [Act on Copyright and Related Rights],
Dec. 20, 2016, BGBL I at 3037, § 51 (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg.html.
90. BGH I ZR 69/08 1.
91. Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at 13; BGH I ZR 69/08 1.
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framework surrounding the quotation right in Germany thus
restricted the room for the Federal Court of Justice to develop a new
type of use privilege.92 As the search service did not comment on
search results (in the sense of establishing an “inner connection”
between quoted material and Google’s own thoughts),93 the Court
could hardly avoid the conclusion that the right of quotation did not
cover unauthorized use of picture thumbnails for search engine
purposes.94
As the German system of exceptions is not flexible enough, the
Federal Court of Justice was thus prevented from applying the right
of quotation.95 Given the contribution of the image search service to
freedom of information in the digital environment,96 however, the
Court developed an alternative solution.97 It created breathing space
for the search service by stating that the copyright holder had given
implicit consent. To achieve this result, the court assumed that the
copyright holder would have used technical means to block the
automatic indexing of online content, if she disagreed with use by
search engines.98 While this assumption of implicit consent creates
additional flexibility, it does not solve the problem of insufficient
flexibility within the system of copyright exceptions in the EU.99
92. BGH I ZR 69/08 1.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. BGH I ZR 69/08 1.
96. See Mattias Leistner, The German Federal Supreme Court’s Judgment on
Google’s Image Search—A Topical Example of the “Limitations” of the European
Approach to Exceptions and Limitations, 42 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 417, 426 (2011) (stating the difficulties in extending the existing
exceptions to copyright to new technological uses or business models partly results
from the strict interpretation of the exceptions to copyright).
97. Id.
98. BGH I ZR 69/08 1 (14-19); see BGH Oct. 19, 2011, I ZR 140/10,
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-
bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&az=I%20ZR%20140/10.
99. See Lucie Guibault, Why Cherry-Picking Never Leads to Harminisation:
The Case of the Limitations on Copyright under Direction 2001/29/EC, 1 J.
INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & E-COMMERCE L. 55, 57 (2010) (stating that by
failing to technically prevent the reproduction and/or communication to the public
of his work, the right’s owner gives implicit permission to others to do so and puts
the copyright rule on its head); Leistner, supra note 96, at 428 (stating that the
approach of an implied license or consent was based on the assumption that, under
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Moreover, it overstretches the general private law doctrine of
implicit consent to solve a specific copyright problem.100 This, in
turn, gives rise to new legal problems in other fields of private law
where a comparably broad notion of implicit consent leads to
unsatisfactory results.
IV. FEASIBILITY OF A LEGAL TRANSPLANT
Hence, there are clear indications that the implementation of a
flexible fair use element in the EU copyright system is desirable.
This insight, however, leads to the question whether a flexible, open
norm is likely to be applied appropriately in a civil law environment.
Would civil law judges be capable of dealing with a flexible, open-
ended copyright limitation? As pointed out above, the answer to this
question is often in the negative.101 In the debate on the introduction
of open-ended fair use provisions in continental Europe, it is often
argued that judges with a civil law background do not have the
experience necessary to apply open-ended norms in an appropriate
way.102 In this way, a meaningful debate about fair use legislation is
thwarted from the outset. Policy makers are concerned that the
adoption of fair use provisions could ask too much of civil law
judges, erode traditional civil law culture and, ultimately lead to
“chaos and anarchy” in copyright law.103 To answer the question
certain conditions, the publication of an image on the internet implies the consent
to the image’s inclusion in the image search service, which implies consent to the
production of a thumbnail as well); Bridging the Differences Between Copyright’s
Legal Traditions, supra note 3, at 538 (stating the German Federal Court of Justice
introduced a flexible element through the backdoor of doubtful assumptions of the
intentions of a copyright owner making her works available on the Internet);
Gerald Spindler, Bildersuchmanschinen, Schranken und kohkludente Elnwilligung
im Urheberrecht, 9 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR]
785 (2010).
100. Bridging the Differences Between Copyright’s Legal Traditions, supra note
3, at 541-42 (stating that in the present context, the term fair use broadly refers to
an opening clause that would add flexibility to the regulation of copyright
limitations).
101. Id. at 541 (stating it is doubtful whether a sudden change from a closed
catalogue of exceptions to an open-ended norm would yield the expected beneficial
results).
102. Id.
103. See Guibault, supra note 99, at 58 (stating the fact that member states have
implemented the same limitation differently, giving rise to a variety of different
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adequately, the broader context of law making in civil law countries
must be taken into account. As all law making, civil law legislation
must mediate between the maxims of legal security, which favors
precisely defined legal provisions that provide optimal predictability ex
post, and of fairness, which favors open and flexible legal concepts that
allow a wide margin of judicial appreciation ad hoc.104 In civil law this
compromise between legal security and fairness is achieved by codifying
relatively abstract and open legal provisions that spell out the general
rules without impeding civil courts to apply general normative principles,
such as ‘reasonableness and fairness’[ . . . ] to arrive at fair judgments.105
In fact, private law codifications in civil law jurisdictions provide
for general norms of reasonableness and fairness.106 The German
Civil Code contains the overarching norm of Treu und Glauben.107
The Dutch Civil Code offers redelijkheid en billijkheid as a general
balancing tool.108 A line between these concepts and general notions
of reasonableness and fairness can easily be drawn.109 The norms of
Treu und Glauben and redelijkheid en billijkheid serve as a means to
reconcile competing interests in situations where more detailed
statutory provisions do not offer appropriate legal solutions.110
Interestingly, the historical analysis of the development of civil
codes in continental Europe shows that these open norms and
principles made it possible for the courts to constantly adapt private
law codifications to changing needs in society.111 The German Civil
rules applicable to the same situation, constitutes a serious impediment to the
establishment of cross-border services).
104. Bridging the Differences Between Copyright’s Legal Traditions, supra note
3, at 547-48 (stating open factors constituting the fair use criteria allow the courts
to determine special cases of permissible, unauthorized use in the light of the
individual circumstances of a given case).
105. See Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 3, at 6.
106. See generally Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], translation at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.pdf (Ger.); Art. 6:2
para. 1 BW, http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0005289/2017-07-01.
107. BGB § 157 (Ger.).
108. See Popke SJOERD BAKKER, REDELIJKHEID EN BILLIJKHEID ALS
GEDRAGSNORM (2012).
109. See generally BGB (Ger.); Art. 6:2 para. 1 BW.
110. See generally BGB (Ger); Bakker, supra note 108.
111. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 143 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 3rd ed. 1998) (stating that many
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Code,112 for instance, entered into force on January 1, 1900. At that
time, however, it was already outdated in several respects because of
the underlying conservative concept of the typical citizen:
The Code does indeed accurately reflect the society of Bismarck’s
Empire. The chief role in the state at that time was played by a liberal
grande bourgeoisie which had produced the imperial German nation-state
by co-operating with the conservative powers of authoritarian Prussia. It
was the day of a marked liberalism in economics, of the belief that the
general good would spontaneously ensue from the interplay of economic
forces.113
The German Civil Code, thus, failed to focus on the growing
importance of commerce and industry at the turn of the century. It
also did not address the needs of rapidly expanding urban
populations. Instead, it took as a starting point the skills of an
entrepreneur, land owner or official and presupposed business
experience, sound judgment, and the ability to protect oneself against
the rigors of freedom of contract and freedom of competition in
private law transactions.114 As a result, German courts had to adapt
the Civil Code to constantly changing economic, social, and cultural
conditions during the last hundred years, including the adoption of a
German constitution establishing a democratic and social federal
state after the Second World War.115 To achieve this goal, the
German Federal Court of Justice relied on several open-ended,
general clauses in the Civil Code,116 in particular the aforementioned
principle of Treu und Glauben.117
codes consolidate the results of a recent reconstruction of society).
112. See Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], translation at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.pdf (Ger.).
113. Zweigert & Kötz, supra note 111, at 144.
114. Id.
115. Cf. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 20, para. 1, translation at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.pdf (Ger.) (“The
Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state”).
116. See BGB § 138, para. 1 (Ger.) (mentioning the nullity of contracts
conflicting with standards or morality); BGB § 157 (Ger.) (stating the construction
of contracts in line with “Treu und Glauben”); BGB § 242 (Ger.) (expressing the
principle of “Treu und Glauben” with regard to the proper performance of
contracts); BGB § 826 (Ger.) (stating obligations arising from damage caused on
purpose under tort law).
117. BGB § 157 (Ger.).
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The crucial role of general clauses in private law codifications of
civil law countries is even explicitly confirmed in Article 1 of the
Swiss Civil Code:118 “If no relevant provision can be found in a
statute, the judge must decide in accordance with the customary law
and, in its absence, in accordance with the rule which he would, were
he the legislator, adopt. In so doing he must pay attention to accepted
doctrine and tradition.”119 Hence, civil law judges can be expected to
have the expertise necessary to deal with open-ended, flexible
provisions in the field of private law. A flexible provision in
copyright law would not pose a new challenge differing substantially
from the norms they are applying in other areas of private law.120
Moreover, international and EU copyright law121 already contain
broad exclusive rights of reproduction and communication to the
public which constitute open-ended, flexible provisions. National
provisions setting forth exclusive rights may be even broader.122
From this perspective, civil law judges are applying general clauses
in copyright law already at this stage.123
As to concerns about sufficiently clear legal standards evolving
from open-ended norms, one must also take into account the
118. Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch [ZGB], Civil Code [CC], Codice Civile
[CC] [Civil Code] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art. 1 (Switz.).
119. Zweigert & Kötz, supra note 111, at 176.
120. See id. at 176-77 (stating that this provision is not fundamentally new
because creative judicial activity is used when courts exhaust other possibilities of
reasonable interpretation).
121. See generally Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, art. 9, para. 1, Sept. 9, 1886, 331 U.N.T.S. 217 (as amended on Sept. 28,
1979), https://www.keionline.org/sites/default/files/1971_revision_of_Berne.pdf;
WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997),
36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/wct/trt_wct_
001en.pdf; Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at 16.
122. See Auteurswet 23 Sept. 1912, <gazette abbreviation> 1912,
http://wetten.overheid.nl/
BWBR0001886/2015-07-01; UrhG § 15(1) (Ger.) (stating the author has right to
exploit his own work including the rights of reproduction, distribution, and
exhibition); Jaap Spoor, Verveelvoudigen: Reproduction and Adaptation under the
1912 Copyright Act, in A CENTURY OF DUTCH COPYRIGHT LAW 197, 200-01
(Bernt Hugenholtz, Antoon Quaedvlieg, & Dirk Visser eds., 2012) (stating as
technology developed, the broad terminology offered ample room for extensive
interpretation).
123. See Zweigert & Kötz, supra note 111, at 176-77 (noting that judges have to
pay attention to doctrine and tradition along with customary law).
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obligation to achieve legal certainty in civil law jurisdictions.124 As
with their colleagues in common law countries, civil law judges must
ensure that their decisions guarantee a sufficient degree of legal
certainty and make future decisions foreseeable.125 Therefore, civil
law courts strive for the development of a consistent line of decisions
– in the sense of new decisions following relevant case precedents.126
The judgments of civil law tribunals cite pertinent case precedents
and explain which insights for the solution of the present case can be
derived from the conclusions drawn in earlier decisions.127 Referring
to this obligation to ensure the evolution of consistent case law,
Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona gave the following
explanation of civil law rules on case precedent in his recent opinion
in the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case Stichting
Brein/Filmspeler: “The requirement of certainty in the application of
the law obliges the court, if not to apply the stare decisis in absolute
terms, then to take care to follow the decisions it has itself, after
mature reflection, previously adopted in relation to a given legal
problem.”128
This obligation to follow previous decisions on similar legal issues
has repercussions on decision making at different levels of the
judicial hierarchy. In the light of the requirement of legal certainty, a
lower civil law court seeks to follow decisions of higher courts and
exercise its discretion in line with the ratio decidendi that led to
relevant case precedents.129 This is inevitable from the perspective of
124. Bridging the Differences Between Copyright’s Legal Traditions, supra note
3, at 527-28 (stating courts can secure a sufficient degree of legal certainty by




127. Cf. CJEU, Judgment in GS Media BV [2016], C-160/15, EU:C:2016:644,
¶¶ 28-43 (giving various references to previous decisions on the scope of the right
of communication to the public7# C3EU, 3udgment in Copydan !"ndkopi ;+5,5:,
C-463/12, EU:C:2015:144, ¶¶ 19-25, 44-48, 69-78 (giving numerous references to
previous decisions on the modalities of paying fair compensation for acts of private
copying).
128. CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona in
Stichting Brein [2016], C-527/15, EU:C:2016:938, ¶ 41.
129. See T. Koopmans, Stare Decisis in European Law, in ESSAYS IN EUROPEAN
LAW AND INTEGRATION 11, 22 (David O’Keeffe & Henry G. Schermers eds.,
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procedural economy. The process would trigger unnecessary appeals
if a lower court deviated from the approach taken by a higher court
in cases where the facts and circumstances are not reasonably
distinguishable from those underlying pre-existing case law.130
Although civil law systems do not compel judges to rigidly adhere to
previous decisions, the obligation to achieve legal certainty and
procedural economy thus ensures that case precedents are
substantially followed.131
Therefore, civil law countries do not take court decisions based on
a flexible, open norm in a judicial vacuum. A civil law judge
applying an open-ended norm, such as Treu und Glauben in German
law or redelijkheid en billijkheid in Dutch law, will seek to
contribute to the evolution of consistent case law and enhance legal
certainty by following relevant case precedents.132 If EU law
enshrines a flexible, open norm, primary EU legislation offers
additional safeguards against divergent court decisions at the national
level.133 Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU)134 provides that any national court or tribunal against
whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, is
obliged to bring matters concerning the interpretation of EU law
before the CJEU and request a prejudicial ruling.135 National courts
whose decisions are appealable are free to ask prejudicial questions
about the interpretation of EU law if they deem this necessary to give
a judgment.136
In practice, TFEU article 267 ensures that the CJEU has the final
word on the interpretation of open norms in EU law.137 Once the
1982) (defining ratio decidendi as “any rule of law expressly or impliedly treated
by the judge as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion, having regard to the
line of reasoning adopted by him.”).
130. See id. at 23.
131. Cf. id. at 13 (describing the approach of civil law jurisdictions, particularly
developments in English law that favor flexible rather than rigid approaches).
132. See Flexible Copyright, supra note 3, at 279.
133. See Koopmans, supra note 129, at 16.
134. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
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CJEU decides a prejudicial question submitted in accordance with
article 267, the interpretation developed by the CJEU is binding for
the national court posing the question and all other courts applying
the same open norm.138 If a different case raises doubts about the
application of the interpretation developed by the CJEU, the national
courts dealing with this different case are not free to develop their
own solution without consulting the CJEU.139 Instead, prejudicial
questions about the right interpretation in light of the facts and
circumstances of that different case will have to be submitted.140 The
request for a prejudicial ruling remains an option under article 267 as
long as parties can appeal the decision of a national court.141 The
highest national courts and tribunals against whose decisions there is
no judicial remedy under national law, however, are obliged to pose
prejudicial questions on harmonized law before taking a final
decision.142
Considering this configuration of the system of case precedent in
the EU, the introduction of a flexible element in the field of
copyright limitations can hardly be expected to pose extraordinary
difficulties. Civil law judges will seek to diminish the risk of legal
uncertainty by developing a consistent line of case law.143 Given the
existence of long-standing general clauses in civil law statutes,
including droit d’auteur legislation providing for flexible exclusive
rights, civil law judges are also unlikely to experience particular
difficulties when applying an additional open norm in the field of
copyright limitations.144 The alleged inability of civil law judges to
appropriately apply a flexible, open-ended norm in the field of
copyright limitations simply does not constitute a valid argument








143. See Flexible Copyright, supra note 3, at 279.
144. See id. at 279.
145. See id. at 282.
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To further support this argument, a comparative analysis can be
conducted that brings the situation in EU trademark law into focus.
In the field of protection of trademarks against dilution, EU
trademark law provides for broad exclusive rights against blurring,
tarnishing, and unfair free-riding that are counterbalanced by a
flexible, open-ended defense of “due cause”.146 Article 10(2)(c) of
146. See Lionel Bently, From Communication to Thing: Historical Aspects of
the Conceptualisation of Trade Marks as Property, in TRADEMARK LAW AND
THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 3, 3-41 (Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008); R.C. Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark
Rights and Expressive Values: How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love
Ambiguity, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH 261, 261-93 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar 2008); C. Geiger, Marques et droits fondamentaux, in LES DÉFIS DU
DROIT DES MARQUES AU 21E SIÈCLE/CHALLENGES FOR TRADEMARK LAW IN THE
21STCENTURY, 163, 163 (C. Geiger & J. Schmidt-Szalewski eds., 2010); ANNETTE
KUR & M.R.F. SENFTLEBEN WITH VERENA VON BOMHARD, EUROPEAN TRADE
MARK LAW – A COMMENTARY para. 5.182-5.272 (2017) (analyzing the protection
of trademarks against dilution in the EU); Robert Burrell & Dev Gangjee, Trade
Marks and Freedom of Expression: A Call for Caution, 41 INT’L REV. OF INTELL.
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 544, 544-46 (2010); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 402-04 (1990); Ilanah Simon Fhima, Trade Marks and
Free Speech, 44 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 293, 293-321
(2013); Christophe Geiger, Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression – the
Proportionality of Criticism, 38 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L.
317, 317-27 (2007); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between
Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in
Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887, 891-95 (2005); William McGeveran,
Four Free Speech Goals for Trademark Law, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA
AND ENT. L.J. 1205, 1207-10 (2008); M.A. Nasser, Trade Marks and Freedom of
Expression, 40 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 188, 188-90
(2009); Lisa P. Ramsey, Free Speech and International Obligations to Protect
Trademarks, 35 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 405, 405-467 (2010); Lisa P. Ramsey & Jens
Schovsbo, Mechanisms for Limiting Trade Mark Rights to Further Competition
and Free Speech, 44 INT’LREV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 671, 671-700
(2013); see also W. SAKULIN, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION – AN INQUIRY INTO THE CONFLICT BETWEEN TRADEMARK RIGHTS
AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER EUROPEAN LAW (2010) (discussing the
general need for robust limitations of ant-dilution protection to safeguard freedom
of expression and freedom of competition); M.R.F. Senftleben, Free Signs and
Free Use - How to Offer Room for Freedom of Expression within the Trademark
System, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 354, 354-76 (Christophe Geiger ed., Edward Elgar 2015) [hereinafter
Free Signs and Free Use]; Katja G. Weckström, The Lawfulness of Criticizing Big
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the EU Trade Mark Directive (EUTMD)147 and article 9(2)(c) of the
EU Trade Mark Regulation (EUTMR)148 provide for an exclusive
right of trademark owners to prevent all unauthorized third parties
from using, in the course of trade in relation to goods or services, any
sign where:
the sign is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark irrespective of
whether it is used in relation to goods or services which are identical with,
similar to, or not similar to, those for which the trade mark is registered,
where the latter has a reputation in the Member State and where use of
that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to,
the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.149 (emphasis
added)
The jurisprudence of the CJEU shows that the application of this
in-built defense of due cause does not pose particular difficulties.150
In several decisions, the CJEU seized the opportunity to employ the
open-ended due cause defense to ensure an appropriate balance
between rights and limitations in EU trademark law.151 In Interflora
v. Marks & Spencer, the court held that use of a mark with a
reputation for the purpose of keyword advertising amounted to the
taking advantage of the distinctive character and repute of the
mark.152 This finding of free-riding, however, did not readily imply a
finding of infringement.153 Instead, the Court found that there was
room for use with due cause:
Business: Comparing Approaches to the Balancing of Societal Interests Behind
Trademark Protection, 11 LEWIS&CLARK L. REV. 671, 682-86 (2007).
147. Directive 2015/2436, art. 10(2)(c), of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 Dec. 2015 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to
trade marks, 2015 O.J. (L 336) 1 [hereinafter art. 10(2)(c) EUTMD].
148. Commission Regulation 2015/2424, art. 9(2)(c), 2015 O.J. (L 341) 21
[hereinafter art. 9(2)(c) EUTMR].
149. Art. 10(2)(c) EUTMD, supra note 147; accord art. 9(2)(c) EUTMR, supra
note 148.
150. See Case C-65/12, Leidseplein Beheer v. Red Bull, 2014 E.C.R. 49; Case
C-252/12, Specsavers v. Asda, 2013 E.C.R. 497; Case C-323/09, Interflora v.
Marks & Spencer, 2011 E.C.R. 604; Case C-487/07, L’Oréal v. Bellure, 2009
E.C.R. 49.
151. See id.
152. Interflora, 2011 E.C.R., para. 86-88.
153. Id. para. 93.
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where the advertisement displayed on the internet on the basis of a
keyword corresponding to a trade mark with a reputation puts forward –
without offering a mere imitation of the goods or services of the
proprietor of that trade mark, without causing dilution or tarnishment and
without, moreover, adversely affecting the functions of the trade mark
concerned – an alternative to the goods or services of the proprietor of the
trade mark with a reputation, it must be concluded that such use falls, as a
rule, within the ambit of fair competition in the sector for the goods or
services concerned and is thus not without ‘due cause.’154
Hence, the court established not only a due cause defense for the
purpose of informing consumers about an alternative offer in the
marketplace but also developed three due cause factors to be taken
into account in this context; namely whether the defendant (1)
offered a mere imitation of the goods or services of the trademark
proprietor; (2) damaged the trademark by causing harm to its
distinctive character (dilution or blurring) or repute (tarnishment); (3)
made use adversely affecting the functions of the trademark.155
The emergence of this first set of due cause factors in Interflora v.
Marks & Spencer sheds light on certain general features of the
underlying due cause concept. Firstly, it seems that in the area of
freedom of competition and commercial freedom of expression, the
CJEU is prepared to employ the due cause defense as a tool to
outweigh the broad grant of protection against free-riding.156 In
154. Id. para. 91.
155. See Y. BASIRE, LES FONCTIONS DE LA MARQUE, ESSAI SUR LA COHÉRENCE
DU RÉGIME JURIDIQUE D’UN SIGNE DISTINCTIF (2014); F. HACKER,
FUNKTIONENLEHRE UND BENUTZUNGSBEGRIFF NACH ‘L’ORÉAL’, MARKENRECHT
333 (2009); Ilanah Simon Fhima, How Does “Essential Function” Doctrine Drive
European Trade Mark Law?, 36 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L.
401 (2005); T. Cohen Jehoram, The Function Theory in European Trade Mark
Law and the Holistic Approach of the CJEU, 102 THE TRADEMARK REP. 1243
(2012); Annette Kur, Trademarks Function, Don’t They?, 45 INT’L REV. OF
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 434 (2014); M.R.F. Senftleben, Function Theory
and International Exhaustion: Why it is Wise to Confine the Double Identity Rule
in EU Trade Mark Law to Cases Affecting the Origin Function, 36 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 518, 518-21 (2014); P.J. Yap, Essential Function of a Trade Mark:
From BMW to O2, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 81, 86-87 (2009).
156. See Martin Senftleben, Adapting EU Trademark Law to New Technologies:
Back to Basics?, in CONSTRUCTING EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES 137, 158 (Christophe Geiger ed., Edward
Elgar 2013) [hereinafter Adapting EU Trademark Law to New Technologies].
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L’Oréal v. Bellure, the court held that a mere attempt to ride “on the
coat-tails of a mark with a reputation” to benefit from its power of
attraction, its reputation and its prestige, was sufficient to find prima
facie infringement.157 The court’s willingness to develop a specific
due cause defense in Interflora v. Marks & Spencer shows that this
broad grant of protection in the area of free-riding need not be the
last word when it comes to use that enhances fair competition and
consumer information.158
Use that damages a mark with a reputation, however, is unlikely to
qualify as use with due cause.159 The described Interflora factors,
quite clearly, seek to exclude the possibility of relying on the due
cause defense in cases where harm is caused.160 A successful
invocation of the due cause defense for purposes of commercial
speech is thus unlikely when the use brings detriment to the
distinctive character or the repute of a mark with a reputation.161 This
configuration of the due cause test is in line with assessment factors
known from copyright law, such as the fourth factor of the U.S. fair
use doctrine addressing “the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work”162 or the second
criterion of the international three-step test which prohibits a
“conflict with a normal exploitation of the work.”163
157. Case C-487/07, L’Oréal v. Bellure, 2009 E.C.R. 49, para. 49.
158. Interflora, 2011 E.C.R., para. 91.
159. See Adapting EU Trademark Law to New Technologies, supra note 156, at
159.
160. Interflora, 2011 E.C.R., para. 91.
161. See Adapting EU Trademark Law to New Technologies, supra note 156, at
156-60.
162. See generally Comparative Approaches to Fair Use, supra note 1, at 32
(comparing the U.S. fair use doctrine with copyright exception reforms in the EU
system).
163. Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation, supra note 61, at 707;
Christophe Geiger, Daniel Gervais, & Martin Senftleben, The Three-Step Test
Revisited: How to Use the Test’s Flexibility in National Copyright Law, 29 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 581, 582-86 (2014) [hereinafter The Three-Step Test Revisited];
Geiger, The Three-Step Test, a Threat to a Balanced Copyright Law?, supra note
58, at 683; Daniel J. Gervais, Making Copyright Whole: A Principled Approach to
Copyright Exceptions and Limitations, 5 U. OF OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1, 30
(2008); Griffiths, supra note 3, at 428-31; T. Heide, The Berne Three-Step Test
and the Proposed Copyright Directive, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 105, 106 (1999);
M.R.F. Senftleben, How to Overcome the Normal Exploitation Obstacle: Opt-Out
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Apart from the need to reconcile trademark protection with the
guarantee of commercial freedom of expression, the CJEU also
addressed conflicting rights and interests of the defendant that may
oblige the trademark proprietor to tolerate the use of a sign similar to
her mark with a reputation.164 With regard to this category of due
cause, the CJEU indicated in Specsavers v. Asda that Asda’s use of a
sign in the color green did not automatically amount to unfair free-
riding on the trademark which Specsavers had continuously been
using in that color.165 By contrast, the allegedly infringing use may
have be justified if Asda could have showed that it was itself
associated, in the mind of a significant portion of the public, with the
color green and that this color had been used for the representation of
the conflicting sign.166
After this precursor, the case Leidseplein Beheer v. Red Bull167
gave the CJEU the opportunity to refine the due cause factors in the
area of subjective third-party interests. The case raised the question
of under which conditions due cause may cover the continued use of
the sign “Bulldog” when that use started prior to the registration of
the trademark RED BULL, remained limited to dissimilar bar and
restaurant services before the trademark acquired a reputation and, at
a later stage, led to the registration of “Bulldog” as word and
figurative marks in relation to the same goods and services.168 In the
Court’s view, a due cause could potentially be found in this situation
based on two factors: (1) a determination as to how the Bulldog sign
had been accepted by, and what its reputation was with, the relevant
public; (2) an examination of the intention of the person using the
Bulldog sign.169 The CJEU added sub-factors for the determination of
Formalities, Embargo Periods, and the International Three-Step Test, BERKELEY
TECH. L. J. COMMENTS. 1, No. 1 (2014).
164. See Case C-252/12, Specsavers v. Asda, 2013 E.C.R. 497 (deciding that the
use of a color that can be shown by the third party to also be associated with their
company is not enough to establish unfair use).
165. Id. para. 46-48.
166. Id. para. 49.
167. Case C-65/12, 2014 E.C.R. 49 (deciding that the use of a registered mark
by a third party is acceptable if it was used prior to the marks registration and in
good faith).
168. Id. para. 50-51.
169. Id. para. 53-55.
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use in good faith, namely (3) the degree of proximity between the
goods and services for which the conflicting sign had been used and
the product for which the reputed mark was registered, (4) the
moment when the conflicting sign was first used for a product
identical to that for which the trademark was registered and (5) the
point in time when the trademark acquired its reputation.170
As to the interplay of these sub-factors, the Court explained that it
may be of particular relevance whether the extended use of the
Bulldog sign to energy drinks could be seen as a natural extension of
the bar and restaurant services for which “Bulldog” already enjoyed
a certain reputation with the relevant public.171 Moreover, the court
considered that, the greater the repute of the Bulldog sign prior to the
registration of RED BULL, the more its use may be necessary for
continued marketing of a product identical to products for which the
mark was registered.172 Good faith obliging the trademark proprietor
to tolerate use of a conflicting sign for identical goods or services
required, in particular, the assessment of how the conflicting sign had
been accepted by, and what its reputation was with, the relevant
public; the degree of proximity between the goods and services for
which that sign was originally used and the product for which the
mark with a reputation was registered; and the economic and
commercial significance of the use for that product of the sign which
was similar to the mark with a reputation.173
These decisions show that the CJEU had no difficulty in deriving
appropriate assessment factors from the open due cause defense in
EU trademark law. These due cause factors make the future
application of the same defense more concrete and the outcome of
the court’s appreciation of a given case more foreseeable.174 Hence,
170. Id. para. 53-56.
171. Id. para. 57-59.
172. Id.
173. See Case C-65/12, Leidseplein Beheer v. Red Bull, 2014 E.C.R. 49, para.
60-61.
174. See Panel Report, United States - Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act,
WTO Doc. WT/DS160/R, para. 6.108 (June 2000) [hereinafter Section 110(5)
Panel Report] (leaving room for the adoption of fair use legislation by pointing out
that it was not necessary “to identify explicitly each and every possible situation to
which the exception could apply, provided that the scope of the exception was
known and particularised”); Lucas, supra note 33, at 282; The Three-Step Test
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CJEU jurisprudence does not indicate in any way that civil law
judges are incapable of applying an open-ended defense, such as the
due cause defense in EU trademark law.175
As the present analysis is carried out against the background of the
situation in copyright law, it is of particular interest to also explore
the application of the due cause defense in cases involving artistic or
political speech. This focus corresponds with the particular
importance that is traditionally attached to “transformative use” for
the purpose of generating new forms of expression in U.S. decisions
addressing the fair use defense in copyright law.176 So far, the CJEU
has not had the opportunity to decide cases involving the invocation
of the trademark due cause defense with regard to political or artistic
speech.177 National decisions in civil law jurisdictions, however,
demonstrate the potential of the due cause defense to serve as a
safeguard for political and artistic freedom of expression.178 The case
Lila Postkarte of the German Federal Court of Justice, for example,
concerned the marketing of postcards that ironically alluded to
trademarks and advertising campaigns of the chocolate producer,
Milka.179 On purple background corresponding to Milka’s abstract
color mark, the postcard sought to ridicule the nature idyll with cows
and mountains that is evoked in Milka advertising.180 It showed the
following poem attributed to “Rainer Maria Milka”:
Über allen Wipfeln ist Ruh/
irgendwo blökt eine Kush/
Revisited, supra note 163, at 581; H. Cohen Jehoram, Some Principles of
Exceptions to Copyright, in URHEBERRECHT GESTERN – HEUTE – MORGEN 381
(Peter Ganea, Christopher Heath & Gerhard Schricker eds., München: Verlag C.H.
Beck, 2001) [hereinafter Exceptions to Copyright]; Declaration on a Balanced
Interpretation, supra note 61, at 701.
175. As almost all EU member states follow the civil law tradition (even in the
United Kingdom, Scotland is a civil law jurisdiction), CJEU judges are
predominantly judges with a civil law background.
176. See supra Section 3 (providing an overview of the U.S. fair use approach).
177. See KUR&SENFTLEBEN, supra note 146, para. 5.250-5.272.
178. See SAKULIN, supra note 146, at 282-88; Free Signs and Free Use, supra
note 146, at 368.
179. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH][Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 3, 2005, I ZR
159/02 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 583 (Ger.).
180. Id. at 583.
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Muh!181
Assessing this ironic play with Milka insignia, the German Federal
Court of Justice held that for the use of Milka trademarks to
constitute relevant trademark use in the sense of Article 10(2)(c)
TMD, it was sufficient that the postcard called to mind the well-
known Milka signs.182 Even though being decorative, the use in
question thus gave rise to the question of trademark infringement.183
Accordingly, the German Federal Court of Justice embarked on a
scrutiny of the trademark parody in the light of the infringement
criteria of detriment to distinctive character or repute, and the taking
of unfair advantage.184 Weighing Milka’s concerns about a
disparagement of the trademarks against the fundamental guarantee
of the freedom of art, the Court finally concluded that the freedom of
art had to prevail in light of the ironic statement made with the
postcard.185 The use of Milka trademarks thus took place with “due
cause” in the sense of Article 10(2)(c) TMD.186
Other national decisions show that the due cause defense may also
play an important role in safeguarding political freedom of speech.187
In the light of the fundamental guarantee of freedom of expression,
the German Federal Court of Justice permitted the use of the
expression “gene-milk” in connection with products bearing the
trademarks “Müller”, “Weihenstephan”, “Sachsenmilch” and
“Loose” to make consumers aware of the risks of genetically
modified milk in milk products.188 The French Supreme Court
allowed the use of the trademark ESSO for the purposes of an
environmental campaign which Greenpeace had organized to
181. Id. at 583 (explaining the attribution to ‘Rainer Maria Rilke’ is an allusion
to the famous German writer Rainer Maria Rilke. Passage translates to “It is calm
above the tree tops, somewhere a cow is bellowing. Moo!”).
182. Id. at 584.
183. Id. at 584-585.
184. Id.
185. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH][Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 3, 2005, I ZR
159/02 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 583, 584-85 (Ger.).
186. Id. at 585.
187. See KUR&SENFTLEBEN, supra note 146, para. 5.267, 6.59-6.70.
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criticize environmental policies of the company on the basis of the
trademark caricature “E$$O”.189
National case law also shows the limits of the due cause defense in
parody cases with a commercial background. In the decision
Styriagra,190 the Austrian Supreme Court prohibited the marketing of
pumpkin seeds with blue frosting under the trademark
STYRIAGRA. As the blue frosting and the trademark called to mind
Pfizer’s well-known VIAGRA trademark and the blue Viagra pills,
the court found that the defendant sought to profit unfairly from the
strong reputation of Pfizer’s trademark as a vehicle to draw the
attention of consumers to his pumpkin product.191 In this context, the
Court rejected the argument that use had taken place with due
cause.192 As the defendant conducted his business in the Austrian
state Styria, the trademark STYRIAGRA could be understood as an
ironic blend of the name of the Austrian state where the pumpkin
seeds came from, and the VIAGRA trademark of the plaintiff.193 To
further support his parody argument, the defendant also pointed out
that his ironic play with Pfizer’s trademark and pill color created a
sharp contrast between chemical and natural means to treat erectile
dysfunction.194 The Austrian Supreme Court, however, remained
unimpressed.195 While conceding that the due cause defense could be
invoked to justify an artistic trademark parody, the Austrian Supreme
Court held that in these specific circumstances, the intention to take
unfair advantage of the magnetism of Pfizer’s highly distinctive
trademark was predominant.196 Pfizer’s interest in trademark
189. See Cour de cassation [Cass.][Supreme Court of Judicial Matter] case 06-
10961, Apr. 8, 2008, (Fr.); see also Cour de cassation [Cass.][Supreme Court of
Judicial Matter] case 07-11251, Apr. 8, 2008, (Fr.) (discussing Exxon Mobil
Corporations trademark ESSO which, in this case, was caricatured by replacing the
‘S’ with ‘$’ to insinuate that the company only cares about money and not the
environment).
190. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH][Supreme Court] Sept. 22, 2009, 17 Ob15/09v,
3.4 (Austria).




195. Id. para. 3.4.
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protection thus prevailed over the defendant’s free speech interests.197
Given these balanced and elaborate results, the comparison based
on EU trademark law shows that it is wrong to assume that civil law
judges are incapable of applying an open-ended fair use defense in
an appropriate manner.198 By contrast, judges who successfully apply
the due cause defense in EU trademark law can hardly be expected to
face difficulties in applying a fair use defense in copyright law.199
The argument that open-ended fair use limitations would overstrain
civil law judges and lead to legal uncertainty is mere rhetoric.200 In
reality, judges can put open-ended norms to good use not only in
common law countries but also in civil law countries.201 As their
colleagues across the Atlantic, civil law judges in the EU can be
expected to apply open-ended norms successfully and consistently on
the basis of factors that evolve in relevant case law.202
V. RECALIBRATION OF THE EU SYSTEM
Once the idea of an incompatibility with civil law copyright
systems is unmasked as mere rhetoric, it becomes possible to embark
on a true, meaningful debate about fair use legislation – a debate in
which the option of introducing fair use norms is not discredited
from the outset.203 In fact, the analysis of the evolution of due cause
factors in EU trademark law shows that civil law judges have no
difficulty in handling very abstract provisions, such as a defense of
“due cause” that is not even supplemented with a list of assessment
factors.204 In the absence of legislation that sets forth a list of factors,
relevant assessment criteria will emerge in court decisions. The
trademark decisions Interflora v. Marks & Spencer and Leidseplein
Beheer v. Red Bull illustrates this process.205 Against this
197. Id.
198. Comparative Approaches to Fair Use, supra note 1, at 44-46.
199. Id. at 46.
200. Id.
201. See Bridging the Differences Between Copyright’s Legal Traditions, supra
note 3, at 521-552 (discussing the trans-Atlantic fair use approach).
202. Comparative Approaches to Fair Use, supra note 1, at 44-46.
203. See The Three-Step Test Revisited, supra note 163, at 612-16 (tracing an
overview of the various arguments shaping this debate).
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background, EU policy makers could take the experiences in EU
trademark law as a starting point and introduce a corresponding
defense of “due cause” in EU copyright law. The task of developing
appropriate due cause factors could confidently be left to the courts
in EU Member States – with the CJEU ensuring the evolution of
consistent case law on the basis of prejudicial questions about the
right interpretation that are following from article 267 TFEU.206
Alternatively, EU policy makers could seek to provide more
legislative guidance and adopt not only an open due cause defense
but also a list of assessment factors, such as the factors known from
the US fair use doctrine.207
Considering the current framework of copyright limitations in the
EU, however, a further, more elegant solution should also be taken
into account. As explained above, Article 5(5) ISD sets forth a three-
step test in EU copyright law that is currently applied as an
additional control mechanism: an unauthorized use based on a
precisely-defined national copyright limitation must survive
additional scrutiny in the light of the three-step test.208 Given this
configuration of the EU system of copyright limitations, a new fair
use provision, such as an open-ended defense of “due cause”, would
be subject to scrutiny under the three-step test as well.209 In the
context of the ISD, recital 44 explicitly recalls that
[w]hen applying the exceptions and limitations provided for in this
Directive, they should be exercised in accordance with international
obligations. Such exceptions and limitations may not be applied in a way
which prejudices the legitimate interests of the rightholder or which
conflicts with the normal exploitation of his work or other subject-
matter.210
Hence, the three-step test in Article 5(5) ISD is intended to ensure
compliance with relevant international obligations, namely the
206. Id.
207. Cf. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. 416, 447-52 (1984); Sag, supra note 71;
Samuelson, supra note 71; Beebe, supra note 71; FÖRSTER, supra note 71; Litman,
supra note 71; Leval, supra note 71; Nimmer, supra note 71.
208. Cf. Griffiths, supra note 3, at 435; The International Three-Step Test, supra
note 3, at 69-73.
209. See Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at 13, 17.
210. Id. at 13.
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international three-step tests laid down in article 9(2) BC, article 13
TRIPS and article 10 WCT.211 Courts in the EU will thus continue to
apply the three-step test in cases about the limitation of copyright
protection.212 In addition to due cause factors that may follow from
legislation or evolve in case law, they will consider the requirement
of a certain special case, the prohibition of a conflict with a normal
exploitation and the prohibition of an unreasonable prejudice to
legitimate interests.213 In consequence, the three-step test will not
lose the character of an additional control mechanism in the EU: an
unauthorized use that is deemed permissible in the light of due cause
factors would still have to satisfy the criteria of the three-step test.214
At the international level, the role of the three-step test is not
confined to this use as an additional control instrument. The first
three-step test in international copyright law – Article 9(2) BC, was
based on a drafting proposal tabled by the UK delegation at the 1967
Stockholm Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention.215
Having its roots in the Anglo-American copyright tradition, it is not
surprising that the three-step test consists of open-ended factors
comparable to traditional fair use legislation in common law
countries.216 A line between the criteria of the three-step test and the
factors to be found in fair use provisions, such as the US fair use
doctrine, can easily be drawn: the prohibition of a conflict with a
211. Id.; see Berne Convention, supra note 121, art. 9(2); Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (explaining that the
prohibition of a prejudice to legitimate interests of the copyright holder and the
prohibition of a conflict with a normal exploitation are direct references to the
three-step test); WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 121, art. 10; The International
Three-Step Test, supra note 3, at 76.
212. Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forenig, 2009 E.C.R.
1, ¶ 56, 58, http://curia.europa.edu; Case C-435/12, Adam BV v. Stichting de
Thuiskopie, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CJ0435, ¶ 39 (Apr. 10, 2014);
Case C-117/13, Technische Universität Darmstadt v. Ulmer, 2014 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 62013CA0117, ¶ 46-48 (Sept. 11, 2014).
213. See Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at 17; Berne Convention, supra
note 121, art. 9(2); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 211, art. 13; WIPO Copyright
Treaty, supra note 121, art. 10.
214. See Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at 17.
215. See WIPO, supra note 49, at 630; The International Three-Step Test, supra
note 3, at 74.
216. See Comparative Approaches to Fair Use, supra note 1, at 37.
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normal exploitation, for instance, recalls the fourth factor of the US
fair use doctrine “effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.”217
Not surprisingly, the Stockholm Conference perceived the three-
step test as a flexible framework in which national legislators enjoy
the freedom of adopting copyright limitations to satisfy domestic
social, cultural, and economic needs.218 This international acquis of
the provision shows that, in sharp contrast to the impression given by
current EU legislation, the three-step test need not function as a
straitjacket of copyright limitations.219 At the international level, the
three-step test serves as a compromise solution that allows national
policy makers to tailor copyright limitations to their specific
domestic needs.220
The 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference leading to the adoption of
the WIPO Copyright Treaty confirms this understanding of the
international three-step test.221 The Agreed Statement Concerning
Article 10 WCT explicitly addresses the flexibility inherent in the
international three-step test:
It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 permit Contracting
Parties to carry forward and appropriately extent into the digital
environment limitations and exceptions in their national laws which have
been considered acceptable under the Berne Convention. Similarly, these
provisions should be understood to permit Contracting Parties to devise
217. 17 U.S.C. § 107; Leval, supra note 71, at 1124-1125 (“By definition every
fair use involves some loss of royalty revenue because the secondary user has not
paid royalties. Therefore, if an insubstantial loss of revenue turned the fourth factor
in favor of the copyright holder, this factor would never weigh in favor of the
secondary use. . . . The market impairment should not turn the fourth factor unless
it is reasonably substantial. When the injury to the copyright holder’s potential
market would substantially impair the incentive to create works for publication, the
objectives of the copyright law require that this factor weigh heavily against the
secondary user.”); The International Three-Step Test, supra note 3, at 74
(explaining that lessons for the application of an EC fair use doctrine can
particularly be derived from experiences with an overly broad application of the
fourth factor test).
218. SeeWIPO, supra note 49, at 81.
219. See The International Three-Step Test, supra note 3, at 74-76 (discussing
an alternative concept using the three-step test as a flexibility tool).
220. See The Three-Step Test Revisited, supra note 163, at 583-584.
221. SeeWIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 121, art. 10, n.9.
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new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the digital network
environment. It is also understood that Article 10(2) neither reduces nor
extends the scope of applicability of the limitations and exceptions
permitted by the Berne Convention.222
This balanced Agreed Statement, allowing the extension of
traditional and the development of new exceptions and limitations
with regard to the digital environment, is the result of deliberations in
which the intention to ensure copyright limitations a proper ambit of
operation occupied center stage.223 The basic proposal for the later
WIPO Copyright Treaty already noted with regard to limitations that,
When a high level of protection is proposed, there is reason to
balance such protection against other important values in society.
Among these values are the interests of education, scientific
research, the need of the general public for information to be
available in libraries and the interests of persons with a handicap that
prevents them from using ordinary sources of information.224
In this vein, the concern about sufficient breathing space for
socially valuable ends played a decisive role in the deliberations
concerning exceptions and limitations. The Minutes of Main
Committee I mirror the determination to shelter use privileges: the
US sought to safeguard the fair use doctrine.225 Denmark feared that
the new rules under discussion could become “a ‘straight jacket’ for
existing exceptions in areas that were essential for society.”226 Many
delegations opposed the later article 10(2) WCT which subjects
current limitations under the Berne Convention to the three-step
222. Id.
223. See Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights
Questions, Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on
Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases to Be Considered by the Diplomatic
Conference, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., IPO Doc. CRNR/DC/4, 2-3 (Aug. 30,
1996) [hereinafter WIPO Diplomatic Conference Basic Proposal]; Diplomatic
Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, Summary
Minutes, Main Committee I of the Diplomatic Conference, WORLD INTELL. PROP.
ORG., Doc. CRNR/DC/102 (Aug. 26, 1996) [hereinafter WIPO Diplomatic
Conference Summary Minutes].
224. WIPO Diplomatic Conference Basic Proposal, supra note 223, § 12.09.
225. WIPO Diplomatic Conference Summary Minutes, supra note 223, § 488.
226. Id. § 489.
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test.227 Korea unequivocally suggested the deletion of paragraph 2228
– a proposal several other delegations approved229 Singapore, for
instance, elaborated that the second paragraph was “inconsistent with
the commitment to balance copyright laws, where exceptions and
limitations adopted by the Conference were narrowed, and protection
was made broader.”230
The Agreed Statement Concerning Article 10 WCT is thus the
outcome of an international debate in which the need to maintain an
appropriate balance in copyright law has clearly been articulated.231
The three-step test of article 10 WCT is intended not only as a
restrictive control mechanism, but also as a guideline for the
extension of existing copyright limitations, and the introduction of
new limitations in the digital environment.232 The preamble of the
WCT confirms this analysis. It stresses the necessity “to maintain a
balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest,
particularly education, research and access to information, as
reflected in the Berne Convention.”233
Hence, the three-step test need not be employed as an additional
control mechanism. It can also be used to enable limitations and
enhance flexibility.234 This insight supports a different approach to
the introduction of a flexible, open-ended norm in the EU – an
227. See id. § 488, § 489, § 495, § 497, § 488.
228. Id. § 491.
229. See id. § 493, § 500.
230. Id. § 492.
231. The Three-Step Test Revisited, supra note 163, at 590-591.
232. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 121, art. 10, n.9.
233. See Sam Ricketson, The Boundaries of Copyright: Its Proper Limitations
and Exceptions: International Conventions and Treaties, INTELL. PROP. Q. 56, 61-
62 (1999); see also WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 121, at 9; WIPO
Diplomatic Conference Basic Proposal, supra note 223, § 12.09 (explaining that
the WPPT contains a similar formulation in its preamble); WIPO Diplomatic
Conference Summary Minutes, supra note 223, para. 72, 74; cf. Andre Francon, La
conference diplomatique sur certaines question de droit d’auteur et de droits
voisons, REVUE INT’L DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 3 (1997); Exceptions to Copyright,
supra note 174, at 382.
234. See The International Three-Step Test, supra note 3, at 67; see also
Griffiths, supra note 3, at 436-41; Senftleben, Bridging the Differences Between
Copyright’s Legal Traditions, supra note 3, at 545-546 (discussing examples of a
flexible application of the test).
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alternative approach that makes the described enabling function of
the three-step test visible and changes its present restrictive role.
Instead of adopting a due cause defense with specific due cause
factors, the three-step test of Article 5(5) ISD itself can be
recalibrated to serve as an enabling clause that permits the
development of new use privileges case-by-case.235 This recalibration
of the three-step test would not require substantial changes of the
existing legislative framework. It would suffice to redefine Article
5(5) ISD as follows:
In certain special cases comparable to those reflected by the exceptions
and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, the use of works
or other subject-matter may also be exempted from the reproduction right
provided for in Article 2 and/or the right of communication and making
available to the public provided for in Article 3, provided that such use
does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-
matter and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
rightholder.236
In line with this proposal, the exceptions currently enumerated in
paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article 5 ISD would remain unchanged.
The proposed wording, however, would make it clear that these
exceptions are regarded as certain special cases in the sense of the
three-step test.237 Accordingly, they could serve as a reference point
for the identification of further cases of permissible, unauthorized
use.238 The catalogue of explicitly listed EU exceptions would thus
fulfil the same function as the indication of purposes, “such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching [ . . . ], scholarship, or
research,” in Section 107 of the US Copyright Act.239 As a result, the
proposed fair use provision would also solve the problem of
235. See The International Three-Step Test, supra note 3, at 76-77.
236. Id. at 76 (resulting from the Wittem Project that was established in 2002 as
a collaboration between copyright scholars across the European Union concerned
with the future development of European copyright law).
237. See Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, art. 5(1)-(4) (containing
exceptions and limitations that are deemed special cases in the sense of the three-
step test by the words “such as”).
238. See The International Three-Step Test, supra note 3, at 76-77; Bridging the
Differences Between Copyright’s Legal Traditions, supra note 3, at 549.
239. Cf. Bridging the Differences Between Copyright’s Legal Traditions, supra
note 3, at 549.
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insufficient flexibility and insufficient legal certainty under the
current, dysfunctional system of copyright exceptions in the EU.
Once the proposed redefinition of Article 5(5) ISD has occurred,
sufficient flexibility follows from use of the three-step test as an
opening clause that allows the courts to devise new exceptions on the
basis of the exception prototypes listed in Article 5(1) to (4) ISD and
potential further prototypes that may be added in the course of the
reform of copyright law in the EU.240
Furthermore, the change in the use of the three-step test would
enhance the degree of legal certainty provided by the EU system.
The proposed redefinition of the three-step test would prevent the
courts from employing the test as a means of placing additional
constraints on statutory exceptions that are defined precisely in
national legislation.241 By contrast, the court could invoke the
abstract criteria of the test to devise new exceptions.242 As a result,
the legal certainty resulting from the precise definition of use
privileges at the national level would no longer be eroded through
the additional application of the open-ended three-step test.243 In case
of precisely defined national exceptions, users of copyrighted
material could rely on the scope following from the wording of the
respective national provisions.244 There would be no need to
speculate on the outcome of an additional scrutiny in the light of the
three-step test.
240. Comparative Approaches to Fair Use, supra note 1, at 59.
241. See Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at 17 (explaining that the
proposed new wording of Article 5(5) ISD provides for the application of the
three-step test as a tool to develop new exceptions and limitations in the light of
existing prototypes laid down in Article 5(1) to (4) ISD; however, noting that the
new wording would no longer impose an obligation on judges to scrutinize specific
exceptions and limitations (which are already clearly defined) in the light of the
criteria of the three-step test).
242. See The International Three-Step Test, supra note 3, at 76-77.
243. Id. at 73-74.
244. See Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at 17 (considering that national
provisions would no longer be scrutinized in the light of the abstract criteria of the
three-step test, their wording would give a complete picture of the requirements to
be fulfilled for invoking the use privilege concerned; as a result, users invoking a
national copyright exception would no longer have to consider that, in addition to
the requirements stated in national law, the abstract criteria of Article 5(5) ISD
could constitute further obstacles).
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When compared with the lamentable current state of the regulation
of copyright limitations in the EU, the adoption of the proposed fair
use provision based on the three-step test would thus improve the
limitation infrastructure substantially.245 Instead of minimizing both
flexibility and legal certainty, the proposed redefinition of the three-
step test in Article 5(5) ISD would ensure sufficient flexibility to
cope with the challenges of the rapid development of the Internet
and, at the same time, enhance the degree of legal certainty that can
be achieved on the basis of a precise definition of exceptions.246
It is important to note that prior to the adoption of the ISD, the
Dutch Supreme Court – a court in a country following the civil law
tradition – already developed jurisprudence that can be regarded as a
precursor of the proposed legislative reform. In 1995, the Court
sought to open up the closed catalogue of exceptions in the Dutch
Copyright Act and pave the way for more flexibility that would
allow the adequate balancing of interests in the light of new
developments in the area of copyright law.247 In the national
Dior/Evora decision preceding the later judgment of the “CJEU,”248
the Dutch Supreme Court identified the following room for the
creation of additional breathing space within the Dutch system of
exceptions:
In § 6 of Chapter 1 of the Dutch Copyright Act, several exceptions to
copyright are enumerated which, as a general rule, are based on a
balancing of the interests of copyright owners against social or economic
interests of third parties or against the public interest. However, these
explicit exceptions do not exclude the possibility that the limits of
copyright must also be determined more closely in other cases on the
basis of a comparable balancing of interests, in particular when the
lawmaker was not aware of the need for the limitation concerned and the
latter fits in the system of the law – this in the light of the development of
copyright as a means of protecting commercial interests. For the required
245. Cf. The International Three-Step Test, supra note 3, at 77-78.
246. Id. at 78.
247. Christophe Geiger, Flexibilising Copyright – Remedies to the Privatisation
of Information by Copyright Law, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L.
178, 185-97 (2008) (regarding the general need for enhanced flexibility).
248. Case C-337/95, Dior v. Evora, 1997 CURIA ¶¶ 58-59 (declining to
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balancing of interests, one or more of the exceptions enumerated in the
law can be used as a reference point.249
The case concerned advertising which Evora made to draw the
attention of consumers to parallel imports of Dior perfumes sold in
its drugstores at a good price.250 As the luxury perfumes appeared in
regular drugstore advertising brochures, Dior feared an erosion of its
prestigious brand image.251 It relied on cumulative copyright and
trademark protection of the perfume packaging and bottles to put an
end to the advertising campaign and preserve its exclusive
distribution network of official Dior dealers.252
Noting that the first sale exhausted Dior’s copyright on the
packaging and bottles, the Dutch Supreme Court expressed the view
that Dior’s interest in copyright as a weapon against further
reproduction and distribution in the context of advertising did not
have much weight.253 The Court drew a parallel between this
situation and the catalogue exception in article 23 of the Dutch
Copyright Act, which allows the owner of a work of (applied) art to
include the work in a catalogue necessary for a public exhibition or
sale.254 Considering the preference given to the interest in the
unauthorized inclusion of an artistic work in an exhibition or sale
catalogue, the Court concluded that Evora’s interest in the
advertising of the resale of Dior perfume in the Netherlands also had
to prevail – at least as long as no harm would flow from the way in
which Evora advertised the Dior products.255
This national decision of the Dutch Supreme Court is a
fundamental shift in the continental-European tradition of precisely-
defined exceptions.256 In the Netherlands, the decision was






255. HR 20 oktober 1995, NJ 1996, 682 (Dior/Evora) ¶ 3.6.2 (Neth.).
256. See MARTIN SENFLTEBEN, QUOTATIONS, PARODY AND FAIR USE, IN A
CENTURY OF DUTCH COPYRIGHT LAW – AUTEURSWET 1912-2012 359, 369-71 (P.
Bernt Hugenholtz et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter QUOTATIONS, PARODY AND FAIR
USE] (discussing this development).
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predominantly understood to have opened up the closed catalogue of
specific exceptions in the Dutch Copyright Act, which was in force
at that time.257 Several commentators placed the decision in the
context of the fair use doctrine in the U.S.258 Instead of relying on
abstract factors as guidelines for the identification of a fair use, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that there was a possibility of using
existing exceptions in the Dutch Copyright Act as a model for the
creation of new exceptions.259 On the basis of a comparable
balancing of interests, gaps in the limitation infrastructure could be
filled as long as the envisaged new use privilege was in line with the
Dutch system of exceptions.260
With regard to the introduction of an open-ended copyright
limitation at EU level, this Dutch precursor confirms that courts
could derive fair use flexibility from the application of well-
established exception prototypes by analogy.261 The above-described
legislative reform – the incorporation of the new, recalibrated Article
5(5) ISD – would follow this approach and give the CJEU the
opportunity to develop a flexible framework for copyright limitations
on the basis of the open-ended three-step test without losing sight of
the existing acquis of long-standing, specific copyright limitations.262
The question, then, is how the CJEU would deal with the three-step
test as an open norm that allows the development of new use
privileges case-by-case.
As a result of the reform proposal made above, the role of the
three-step test would change significantly: from a test that is
employed to further restrict national copyright limitations, to an
opening clause that serves as a basis for the development of new use
privileges in the light of the EU acquis of existing limitations.263 The
257. F.W. Grosheide, De commercialisering van het auteursrecht [Copyright of
Copyright], in TIJDSCH VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA- EN INFORMATIERECHT 43, 43
(1996).
258. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 1976); HR 20 oktober 1995 (Dior/Evora), ¶
2; P. STEINHAUSER, BIJBLAD BIJ DE INDUSTRIËLE EIGENDOM 195, 212 (1998).
259. HR 20 oktober 1995 (Dior/Evora), ¶ 3.6.2.
260. Id.
261. See Comparative Approaches to Fair Use, supra note 1, at 63-65
(discussing further parameters that would support this development).
262. Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at 17.
263. Cf. The International Three-Step Test, supra note 3, at 76-77.
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CJEU would thus have to take a fresh look at the three-step test and
apply it in a way that enables the evolution of new copyright
limitations. Setting forth the requirement of “not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder,” the third step of
the three-step test is of particular importance in this regard.264 The
wording of this test makes it clear that not each and every potential
interest of the copyright holder is relevant.265 Only legitimate
interests are factored into the equation. Furthermore, not each and
every prejudice to legitimate interests is relevant. Only unreasonable
prejudices are inacceptable.266 With these nuances, the third step
offers considerable flexibility for the balancing of competing
interests.267 It offers several checks and balances that can be
understood as parts of a refined proportionality test- the legitimacy of
the interests invoked by right holders are to be weighed against the
reasons justifying the use privilege.268 In addition, the requirement of
“unreasonably prejudice” has always been understood to offer room
for the payment of equitable remuneration.269 Even if a copyright
264. See MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP
TEST 125-33 (2004) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP
TEST] (regarding the particular role of the third test criterion in the framework of
the three-step test).
265. See Martin Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal Standard for Limiting
Intellectual Property Rights? - WTO Panel Reports Shed Light on the Three-Step
Test in Copyright Law and Related Tests in Patent and Trademark Law, 37 INT’L
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 407, 429-35 (2006) [hereinafter Towards a
Horizontal Standard] (providing a discussion of the legitimacy test in WTO Panel
reports).
266. See Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 174, ¶ 6.299 (pointing out that
“a certain amount of prejudice has to be presumed justified as ‘not
unreasonable’”).
267. See SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST, supra
note 264, at 132-35 (emphasising that copyright’s balance succeeds under the third
step).
268. See id. at 226-44 (concerning a proportionality-based approach to the three-
step test).
269. See WIPO, supra note 49, at 1145-46 (introducing the first three-step test
of international copyright law in article 9(2) of the Berne Convention at 1967
Stockholm Conference – this feature of the test was explicitly recognized. Using
the example of private copying, the report on the work of Main Committee I
describes this compensation mechanism as follows: “A practical example might be
photocopying for various purposes. If it consists of producing a very large number
of copies, it may not be permitted, as it conflicts with a normal exploitation of the
work. If it implies a rather large number of copies for use in industrial
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limitation causes an unreasonable prejudice, it may still pass the
three-step test.270 If the payment of equitable remuneration reduces
the corrosive effect of the limitation to a permissible, reasonable
level, the three-step test does not militate against the adoption of the
limitation at the national level.271
In a WTO panel decision dealing with the international three-step
test laid down in Article 13 TRIPS, the panel stated that “one – albeit
arguably incomplete – way of looking at legitimate interests” was an
analysis based on “the economic value of the exclusive rights
conferred by copyright on their holders.”272 Because of this focus on
economic value, the flexibility inherent in the third step did not come
to the fore clearly.273 However, a prior WTO panel report dealing
undertakings, it may not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author, provided that, according to national legislation, an equitable remuneration
is paid.”).
270. Cf. The Three-Step Test Revisited, supra note 163, at 595-97.
271. See SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST, supra
note 264, at 130-32 (discussing the particular role of the third test criterion in the
framework of the three-step test).
272. Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 174, para. 6.227; WIPO, supra
note 49, at 81 (regarding the drafting history); see David J. Brennan, The Three-
Step Test Frenzy: Why the TRIPs Panel Decision Might Be Considered Per
Incuriam, 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 212, 215-16 (2002); Mihaly Fiscor, How Much of
What? The Three-Step Test and Its Application in Two Recent WTO Dispute
Settlement Cases, 192 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 111, 113-17
(2002); Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel
Decision and the “Three-Step Test” for Copyright Exceptions, 187 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 3, 11-13 (2001); Jo Oliver, Copyright in
the WTO: The Panel Decision on the Three-Step Test, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
119, 165-66 (2002); Towards a Horizontal Standard, supra note 265, at 407
(discussing this WTO Dispute Settlement case concerning Section 110(5) of the
US Copyright Act); cf. Daniel Gervais, Fair Use, Fair Dealing, Fair Principles:
Efforts to Conceptualize Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright, 57 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 499, 508-13 (2010); Annette Kur, Of Oceans, Islands,
and Inland Water – How Much Room for Exceptions and Limitations Under the
Three-Step Test?, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 287, 307-08 (2009); SAM
RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS – THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 759-63 (Oxford
University Press, 2nd ed., 2006); SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE
THREE-STEP TEST, supra note 264, at 143, 145, 150, 162, 172-75, 178-81, 183-86,
188-94, 212-19, 225-31.
273. The Three-Step Test Revisited, supra note 163, at 595-607.
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with the patent three-step test in article 30 TRIPS274 took the view
that interests had to be justified in the light of “public policies or
other social norms” in order to be “legitimate” in the sense of the
three-step test.275 This latter approach provides a useful starting point
for the development of a new line of case law in the EU that paves
the way for the identification of new copyright limitations on the
basis of the reform proposal made above; following the WTO panel
dealing with article 30 TRIPS, the CJEU could ask whether interests
asserted by copyright holders are legitimate in the light of “public
policies or other social norms” – policies and norms that include
competing interests of users, such as freedom of expression and
freedom of competition.276 As a result, the analysis would focus on
whether the copyright enforcement claim can be deemed
proportionate in the light of social, cultural, or economic concerns
that support the adoption of a new copyright limitation.277
Once considerations of proportionality are seen as overarching
guidelines for the application of the three-step test, the other
elements of the test – the requirement of a “certain special case” and
the prohibition of a “conflict with a normal exploitation” – can easily
274. Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶
4.8, WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R (adopted Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter WTO Canada]
(Article 30 TRIPS is the three-step test in the patent section of TRIPS which
corresponds with Article 13 TRIPS in the copyright section to a large extent.
Article 30 TRIPS reads as follows: “Members may provide limited exceptions to
the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account
of the legitimate interests of third parties.”); see Towards a Horizontal Standard,
supra note 265, at 407.
275. Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 174, ¶ 6.227; cf. WTO Canada,
supra note 274, ¶ 7.69.
276. WTO Canada, supra note 274, ¶ 7.69.
277. Cf. Christophe Geiger, Exploring the Flexibilities of the TRIPS
Agreement’s Provisions on Limitations and Exceptions, in THE STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW – CAN ONE SIZE FIT ALL? 287, 289 (Annette Kur
& Vytautas Mizaras eds., 2011) (following Christophe Geiger, this normative
approach to the three-step test can also be derived from fundamental rights
obligations resulting from international law and the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights); Christophe Geiger, The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights,
Or How Ethics Can Influence the Shape and Use of IP Law, in METHODS AND
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be placed in this broader framework.278 When viewed through the
prism of proportionality, these tests appear as instruments for sorting
out cases of evident disproportionality.279 In other words, they do not
constitute substantial hurdles unless the allegedly infringing use is
evidently disproportionate and erodes copyright so clearly that, from
the outset, a more detailed analysis in the light of the checks and
balances offered by the final test of “no unreasonable prejudice to
legitimate interests” seems hopeless and unnecessary.280
Under the recalibrated Article 5(5) ISD proposed above, the
evident disproportionality test of “certain special case” could be used
to clarify whether a new use privilege serves a sound policy
objective, such as the limitations laid down in Article 5(1) to (4)
ISD.281 If a clear reason for the recognition of a new use privilege can
be given, this should be sufficient to pass the first step.282 At the level
of the final test of “no unreasonable prejudice to legitimate
interests,” the policy justification can then be weighed carefully
against the legitimate interests of copyright holders.283 Similarly, the
evident disproportionality test of “no conflict with a normal
exploitation” should only focus on those sources of revenue which,
considering the overall commercialization of a work, constitute the
lion’s share of the right holder’s income.284 If a new use privilege
does not deprive the copyright holder of a core element of her
exploitation strategy, the existence of a conflict with a normal
exploitation should readily be refused.285
Even if a new use privilege erodes a major source of income, this
need not directly lead to a finding of infringement. Again, the WTO
panel report dealing with the patent three-step test in article 30
TRIPS can serve as a source of inspiration in this context.286
Interestingly, the WTO panel followed a normative, policy-based
278. SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST, supra
note 264, at 243-44.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 130-33, 243-44.
281. Id. at 137-52.
282. Id. at 152.
283. Id. at 131-33.
284. Id. at 189-193.
285. Id.
286. WTO Canada, supra note 274, ¶ 4.37.
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approach to the question of a conflict with a normal exploitation.287 It
stated that “exploitation” could be considered “normal” when it was
“essential to the achievement of the goals of patent policy.”288
Following this line of reasoning, the CJEU could ask whether a
source of income that would be affected by a new use privilege is
“essential to the achievement of the goals of copyright policy.”289 In
assessing this point, the CJEU could arrive at the conclusion that
even though a major source of income is eroded, the copyright holder
still has sufficient alternative exploitation options at her disposal to
safeguard the incentive and remuneration goals of copyright
protection.290 The CJEU could also consider that the introduction of a
new use privilege contributes to the achievement of copyright policy
to such an extent that the corrosive effect on the copyright holder’s
exploitation strategy cannot be deemed decisive. As copyright policy
does not only aim to provide an incentive and reward for the creation
of works but also seeks to support their dissemination,291 this
scenario may arise in cases where a new use privilege is necessary to
ensure the appropriate dissemination of copyrighted content.292
Viewing steps one and two of the three-step test as preliminary
tests of evident disproportionality and step three as a final, central
test for the assessment of proportionality, it also becomes clear that
287. Id. ¶ 7.57-7.58.
288. Id. ¶ 7.58.
289. Id.
290. See Martin Senftleben, Copyright, Creators and Society’s Need for
Autonomous Art – The Blessing and Curse of Monetary Incentives, in WHAT IFWE
COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT? 25, 28-32 (Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee
Weatherall eds., 2017) [hereinafter Need for Autonomous Art] (discussing the
different rationales of copyright protection).
291. See Calandrillo, supra note 21, at 310; Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for
Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1232 (1998) (providing an early
discussion of the following dualism that is inherent in copyright policy; for
instance, the US Constitution is understood to enshrine the possible grant of
monopoly rights to authors not only to enrich the common store of information, but
it is also an integral part of the overarching objective to foster the welfare of the
public); see also NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 5 (2008)
[hereinafter COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX]; Guy Pessach, Copyright Law as a Silencing
Restriction on Noninfringing Materials: Unveiling the Scope of Copyright’s
Diversity Externalities, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1077 (2003) (discussing the more
recent statements concerning this dualism).
292. COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX, supra note 291, at 6.
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the test procedure following from the three-step test constitutes an
indivisible whole: the three-step test constitutes an indivisible
entirety of considerations concerning the proportionality of a
copyright limitation.293 As pointed out in the Declaration on a
Balanced Interpretation of the Three-Step Test,294 the three steps are
to be considered together – as parts of a multilayered proportionality
analysis – and as an indivisible whole in a comprehensive overall
assessment.295
CJEU jurisprudence does not preclude a new, fresh approach to
the three-step test that is based on considerations of proportionality
even though the indications given in the decision Infopaq/DDF296
point towards the adoption of the traditional continental-European
dogma that copyright exceptions must be interpreted restrictively. In
Infopaq/DDF, the CJEU scrutinized unauthorized use of short text
fragments by a media monitoring service in the light of the
mandatory exemption of transient copies in Article 5(1) ISD.297 The
Court pointed out that for the interpretation of each of the cumulative
conditions of the precisely-defined copyright limitation, it should be
borne in mind that,
according to settled case-law, the provisions of a directive which derogate
from a general principle established by that directive must be interpreted
strictly [ . . . ]. This holds true for the exemption provided for in Article
5(1) of Directive 2001/29, which is a derogation from the general
principle established by that directive, namely the requirement of
authorization from the rightholder for any reproduction of a protected
work.298
293. Cf. The Three-Step Test Revisited, supra note 163, at 585.
294. See Christophe Geiger, Jonathan Griffiths & Reto M. Hilty, Declaration on
a Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 39 INT’L
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707, 711-12 (2008) [hereinafter
Declaration]; Christophe Geiger, Jonathan Griffiths & Reto M. Hilty, Towards a
Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 30 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 489, 493-94 (2008) [hereinafter Towards a Balanced
Interpretation].
295. The Three-Step Test Revisited, supra note 163, at 585.
296. Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009 E.C.R.
¶ 56-58 (Feb. 12, 2009).
297. Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at 12-13.
298. Case C-05/08, ¶ 56-57.
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According to the Court,
[t]his is all the more so given that the exemption must be interpreted in
the light of Article 5(5) of Directive 2001/29, under which that exemption
is to be applied only in certain special cases which do not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.299
The CJEU thus established the rule that copyright limitations had
to be construed narrowly.300 In Football Association Premier League,
301 however, this decision did not hinder the Court from emphasizing
with regard to the same exemption – transient copying in the sense of
Article 5(1) ISD – the need to guarantee the proper functioning of the
limitation and ensure an interpretation that takes due account of the
exception’s objective and purpose. The Court explained that, in spite
of the required strict interpretation, the effectiveness of the limitation
had to be safeguarded.302 On the basis of these considerations, the
Court concluded that the transient copying at issue in Football
Association Premier League, performed within the memory of a
satellite decoder and on a television screen, was compatible with the
three-step test in the current Article 5(5) ISD.303
Given these mixed signals in respect of the application of the
three-step test, it is of particular interest that in Painer/Der Standard,
the Court confirmed the line of argument underlying the decision in
Football Association Premier League with regard to the right of
quotation laid down in Article 5(3)(d) ISD. The Court underlined the
need for an interpretation of the conditions set forth in Article 5(3)(d)
that enables the effectiveness of the quotation right and safeguards its
purpose.304 More specifically, it clarified that Article 5(3)(d) was
“intended to strike a fair balance between the right of freedom of
expression of users of a work or other protected subject-matter and
299. Id. ¶ 58.
300. Id. ¶ 56-58.
301. Case C-403/08, Football Ass’n Premier League, Ltd. v. QC Leisure, 2011
E.C.R. I-9121, ¶ 88 (Feb. 3, 2011).
302. Id. ¶ 162-63.
303. Id. ¶ 181.
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the reproduction right conferred on authors.”305
In its further decision in Deckmyn/Vandersteen, 306 the CJEU
followed the same path with regard to the parody exemption in
Article 5(3)(k) ISD. As in Painer/Der Standard, the Court bypassed
the dogma of a strict interpretation of copyright limitations by
underlining the need to ensure the effectiveness of the parody
exemption as a means to balance copyright protection against
freedom of expression.307
In practice, the CJEU may thus give copyright limitations that
support transformative use a status that comes close to an
independent user right – even though the underlying copyright
statute, the ISD in the EU, does not qualify these limitations as rights
but includes them in the catalogue of exceptions to exclusive rights
instead.308 As the examples taken from CJEU jurisprudence
demonstrate, the fundamental guarantee of freedom of expression
plays a crucial role in this context.309 Relying on article 11 of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights and article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, the CJEU could interpret the
quotation right and the parody exemption less strictly than
limitations without a comparably strong freedom of speech
underpinning. In both the Painer and the Deckmyn decision, the
Court emphasized the need to achieve a “fair balance” between, in
particular, “the rights and interests of authors on the one hand, and
the rights of users of protected subject-matter on the other.”310 The
Court thus referred to quotations and parodies as user “rights” rather
305. Id. ¶ 134.
306. Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, 2014 E.C.R. ¶ 22-23 (May 22,
2014).
307. Id. ¶ 22-23, 25-27.
308. See Need for Autonomous Art, supra note 290, at 46-47 (regarding this
development in EU copyright law).
309. Cf. Benkler, supra note 41, at 357-58; Flexible Copyright, supra note 3, at
276; Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law?, supra note 41, at
371; Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, The Role of Human Rights in
Copyright Enforcement Online: Elaborating a Legal Framework for Website
Blocking, 32 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 43, 46 (2016); Macciacchini, supra note 41;
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, supra note 41, at 285-87;
COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX, supra note 291, at 5-6; STROWEL ET AL., supra note 41;
Copyright and Freedom of Expression, supra note 41, at 240-41.
310. Case C-145/10, ¶ 132; Case C-201/13, ¶ 26.
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than mere user “interests”.311
This status quo gives hope that, after the proposed legislative
reform, the CJEU would develop an approach to the recalibrated
three-step test that, as a result of a proportionality-based analysis of
the different tests, leads to appropriate results in the light of
fundamental rights and freedoms; in particular freedom of expression
and freedom of competition.312 In consequence, the incorporation of
the proposed, recalibrated three-step test in Article 5(5) ISD could
lead to a level of flexibility that is comparable with the effects of the
application of the fair use doctrine in the U.S.313
VI. CONCLUSION
The analysis shows that concerns about overstrained civil law
judges are unfounded. A flexible regulation of copyright limitations
in the EU is unlikely to fail because of an inability or reluctance of
civil law courts to deal with open-ended, flexible norms. The long-
standing, open-ended norms in the general private law of civil law
jurisdictions and the application of the flexible due cause defense in
current EU trademark law clearly show that civil law judges have no
difficulty in applying open-ended norms in an appropriate way and
clarifying the scope and reach of open provisions by developing a
consistent line of case law that makes the outcome of future cases
311. Case C-145/10, ¶ 132; Case C-201/13, ¶ 26.
312. Cf. Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law?, supra note
41, at 371; Christophe Geiger, Copyright’s Fundamental Rights Dimension at EU
Level, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF EU COPYRIGHT 27, 29-31
(Estelle Derclaye ed., 2009); Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights as Common
Principles of European (and International) Intellectual Property Law, in COMMON
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 223 (Ansgar Ohly ed.,
2012); Christophe Geiger, ‘Humanising’ the Intellectual Property System –
Securing a Fair Balance of Interests Through Fundamental Rights at European
and International Level, 33 Q. REV. CORP. L. & SOC’Y 291 (2012) (Japan); Geiger
& Izyumenko, supra note 309, at 46-47.
313. See Bridging the Differences Between Copyright’s Legal Traditions, supra
note 3, at 527 (providing a more detailed analysis of this point); see also Thomas
Dreier, Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain Interests: Inside or Outside of
Proprietary Rights?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 297, 298 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the
desirability of including freedom of expression and freedom of competition
interests in the copyright system of exception and limitations).
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foreseeable. As their colleagues in common law countries, civil law
judges develop assessment factors that serve as guidelines for the
application of open norms.
Against this background, the current EU system could be
approximated to the U.S. system by taking advantage of the
flexibility inherent in the three-step test that has already become a
cornerstone of EU legislation in the field of copyright limitations. As
in international copyright law, the three-step test would have to be
perceived and used as a flexible balancing tool, employed to broaden
existing limitations and introduce new use privileges. To achieve this
redefinition of the three-step test, EU fair use legislation could use
the current catalogue of exceptions in Article 5 ISD as examples of
“certain special cases” in the sense of the three-step test.314 On this
basis, governments should entrust the courts with the task of
identifying further cases of permissible unauthorized use in the light
of the test’s abstract criteria of “no conflict with a normal
exploitation” and “no unreasonable prejudice to legitimate interests.”
As a result, judges would no longer apply the three-step test as an
additional control mechanism and straitjacket of precisely defined
exceptions. The three-step test would no longer erode the legal
certainty following from the precise definition of use privileges.
Serving instead as an opening clause that supplements the EU
catalogue of specific exceptions, the three-step test would provide
the flexibility necessary to benefit from the rapid development of the
Internet while safeguarding freedom of expression and freedom of
competition.
An EU fair use doctrine based on the three-step test would not
only remedy the shortcomings of the current EU system. It may also
have a beneficial effect on the further harmonization of copyright
limitations at the international level. The proposed EU fair use
doctrine would reflect a balanced approach to the three-step test. At
the international level, the open-ended criteria of the three-step test
have always been intended to provide a flexible framework, within
which national legislators enjoy the freedom of safeguarding national
limitations and satisfying domestic social, cultural, and economic
314. Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at 16-17.
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needs.315 Not only the restriction of excessive copyright limitations
but also the broadening of important use privileges and the
introduction of appropriate new exemptions fall within the test’s
field of application. A reinforcement of this balanced understanding
of the test through new EU legislation would be conducive to the
international debate on copyright limitations. It challenges the false
rhetoric of a three-step test that is primarily designed to restrict all
kinds of copyright limitations.316
315. SeeWIPO, supra note 49, at 112-13.
316. See The Three-Step Test Revisited, supra note 163, at 612-15 (providing a
detailed discussion of this problem); Senftleben, Fair Use in the Netherlands,
supra note 58, at 2.
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